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Preface: The Continuity of Government
The Continuity of the Three Branches of
Government. September 11th dispelled the
United States’ naive attitude towards security of
its homeland. The three airplanes that hit the
World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon
caused severe damage and a horrific loss of life.
A fourth plane was downed in a field in
Pennsylvania by brave passengers who stormed
the cockpit. That fourth plane was headed toward
Washington, likely towards the U.S. Capitol.
Al Qaeda targeted our top government leaders.
A lesser-known fifth plane – probably headed
for the White House – was likely prevented from
its course by the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui.
Had this part of the plan been successfully
executed, September 11th would have brought
additional tragedy in loss of life and destruction
of symbolic buildings. It would have hindered
the ability of our government to respond to the
attack. In short, Al Qaeda has shown interest in
incapacitating the leadership of our government. And where Al Qaeda has failed in the
past, such as in the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing, it has returned to strike again.
The Commission. The Continuity of Government
Commission is a private AEI-Brookings commission funded by the Carnegie, Hewlett,
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Packard, and MacArthur Foundations. It is comprised of members with experience in various
branches of government and expertise in the
daily functioning of our government. It was
founded in the fall of 2002 to consider how each
of our three branches of government might
reconstitute themselves after a catastrophic
attack on Washington, D.C. and to make recommendations for statutory and constitutional
changes that would improve the continuity of our
basic institutions. In June of 2003, the commission issued its first report on the Continuity of
Congress.1 In that report the commission unanimously recommended a constitutional amendment that would provide for filling mass vacancies
or mass incapacitations in the U.S. House and
Senate through temporary appointments until
special elections could be held to fill the vacancies. Without such an amendment, an attack
might cause Congress to fall below the quorum
requirement for conducting business and potentially disable Congress for many months until the
numerous vacancies could be filled. The report
spawned much debate in Congress, including
many hearings and the introduction of a variety
of amendments to address this problem.
1 The Continuity of Government Commission. The Congress: Preserving
Our Institutions: The First Report of the Continuity of Government Commission, May 2003
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The Presidency. This is the second report of
the Continuity of Government Commission.
This report addresses our system of Presidential
succession and how we would replace a president after a catastrophic terrorist attack to
ensure the proper functioning of our government. Unlike the current provisions for congressional continuity which do not include any
institutional protections in the case of an attack
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causing mass vacancies or mass incapacitations, there is a Presidential succession system
in place. However, it is the finding of this commission that the current system would be inadequate in the face of a catastrophic attack that
would kill or incapacitate multiple individuals
in the line of succession. The current system
must be corrected to ensure continuity in the
executive branch.
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Commissioner Biographies

Honorary Co-Chairman
President Jimmy Carter
President Gerald R. Ford*

Co-Chairmen°
Alan K. Simpson is a visiting lecturer at the
University of Wyoming and a member of the
Commission on Presidential Debates. Simpson
served in the United States Senate from 1978 to
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and Public Works Committee, and the Special
Committee on Aging. He also served as Chair of
the Veteran Affairs Committee. Before his election to the U.S. Senate, Simpson was elected to
the Wyoming House of Representatives in 1964
where he served as Majority Whip and later
Majority Floor Leader. In 1977 he became
Speaker of the Wyoming House of
Representatives. Simpson served as Director of
the Institute of Politics at Harvard University’s
John F. Kennedy School of Government from
1998 to 2000 and was a member of the Iraq
Study Group in 2006.
*Original honorary Co-chair of the commission,
deceased December 2006.
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David Pryor is the founding Dean of the
Clinton School of Public Service at the
University of Arkansas and Managing
Director of Herrington, Inc. in Little Rock. In
June 2006, Pryor was appointed to the Board
of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
for a six year term. Pryor served in the United
States House of Representatives from 1966
to 1973 and in the United States Senate
from 1975 to 1997. He chaired the Special
Committee on Aging and served as United
States Senate Democratic Conference
Secretary from 1989 to 1995. Before his election to the U.S. House of Representatives,
Pryor was a member of the Arkansas House
of Representatives from 1960 to 1966.
He also served as Governor of Arkansas
from 1975 to 1979, was a fellow at the
Institute of Politics at Harvard University’s
John F. Kennedy School of Government,
and later became Director of the Institute,
serving for 2 years. Pryor served as Interim
Chairman of the Arkansas Democratic
Party and was recently named by Governor
Mike Beebe to the 10-member University
of Arkansas Board of Trustees.*
° Lloyd Cutler was the original Co-chair and Co-founder of the commission,
deceased May 2005.
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Commission Members
Philip Chase Bobbitt is the Herbert Wechsler
Professor of Jurisprudence and Director of
the Center for National Security at Columbia
Law School and senior fellow at the Robert S.
Strauss Center for International Security and
Law at the University of Texas. He is a fellow at
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,
and serves on the Task Force on National
Security and Law at the Hoover Institution, at
Stanford University. Bobbitt served as Associate
Counsel to the President from 1980 to 1981,
Counselor on International Law at the State
Department from 1990 to 1993, Legal Counsel
to the Senate Iran-Contra Committee in 1987,
and Director for Intelligence, Senior Director
for Critical Infrastructure, and Senior Director
for Strategic Planning at the National Security
Council. His books include Tragic Choices
(W.W. Norton and Company, 1978) co-authored
with Guido Calabresi, Constitutional Fate
(Oxford, 1982), Democracy and Deterrence (St
Martin’s, 1987), U.S. Nuclear Strategy
(Macmillan’s, 1989) with Freedman and
Treverton, Constitutional Interpretation
(Blackwell’s, 1991), The Shield of Achilles: War,
Peace and the Course of History (Knopf, 2002),
and Terror and Consent: The Wars for the
Twenty-First Century (Knopf, 2008).
Kenneth M. Duberstein is Chairman and
CEO of The Duberstein Group, an independent strategic planning and consulting company located in Washington, D.C. Duberstein
served as Chief of Staff to President Ronald
Reagan from 1988 to 1989, and as Deputy
Chief of Staff in 1987. From 1981 to 1983 he
served as both an Assistant and the Deputy
Assistant to the President for Legislative
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Affairs. Prior to joining the administration, he
was Vice President and Director of BusinessGovernment Relations of the Committee for
Economic Development. His earlier government service included Deputy Undersecretary
of Labor during the Ford Administration and
Director of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs at the U.S. General Services
Administration. He began his public service
on Capitol Hill as an assistant to Senator Jacob
K. Javits. President Reagan awarded
Duberstein the President’s Citizens Medal in
January of 1989.
Thomas Foley, former Speaker of the House,
is a partner at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer
& Feld LLP. Foley advises clients on matters
of legal and corporate strategy. Foley is
currently Chairman of the Trilateral
Commission. Prior to rejoining the firm in
2001, he served as the 25th U.S. Ambassador
to Japan. Before taking up his diplomatic post
in November 1997, Foley served as the 49th
Speaker of the United States House of
Representatives. He was elected to represent
the State of Washington’s Fifth Congressional
District 15 times, serving his constituents for
30 years from January 1965 to December
1994. Foley served as Majority Leader from
1987 until his election as Speaker on June 6,
1989. From 1981 to 1987 he served as
Majority Whip. He also served as Chairman
of both the House Democratic Caucus and the
Democratic Study Group. Foley has served on
a number of private and public boards of
directors, including the Japan-America
Society of Washington. He also served on the
Board of Advisors for the Center for Strategic
and International Studies and on the Board of
Directors for the Center for National Policy.
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He was a member of the board of governors of
the East-West Center and is currently a
member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Before his appointment as Ambassador, he
served as Chairman of the President’s Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board.
Charles Fried is the Beneficial Professor of
Law at Harvard Law School, where he has
taught since 1961. From 1985 to 1989 he was
Solicitor General of the United States and from
1995 to 1999 he was an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
He has taught courses on appellate advocacy,
commercial law, constitutional law, contracts,
criminal law, federal courts, labor law, torts,
legal philosophy, and medical ethics. His
major works include Saying What The Law Is:
The Constitution in the Supreme Court (Harvard
University Press, 2004), Modern Liberty and
The Limits of Government (W.W. Norton and
Company, 2006), Order and Law: Arguing the
Reagan Revolution (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1991, which has appeared in over a
dozen collections), and Contract as Promise: A
Theory of Contractual Obligation (Harvard
University Press, 1981). He is a member of the
National Academy of Sciences Institute of
Medicine, the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, and the American Law Institute.
Martin Frost, former United States
Representative from Texas from 1979 to 2005,
is a partner at Polsinelli, Shalton, Flanigan,
Suelthaus, PC. While serving in the U.S.
House of Representatives, Frost was the
Ranking Member of the House Committee on
Rules and previously had been Chairman of
the Democratic Caucus from 1999 to 2003, the
third highest leadership post. During the 1996

The Presidency

and 1998 election cycles, he was Chair of the
Democratic
Congressional
Campaign
Committee. An innovative lawmaker with the
ability to craft bipartisan legislation, Frost is
co-author of the 1992 Industrial Base and
Defense Conversion Act which enabled communities and individuals to respond to the
downsizing of the defense industry. He also
authored the National Amber Alert Law that
helps find children victimized by predators.
From 1990 to 1995, Frost chaired a special
House Task Force established to help Eastern
and Central European nations transition to
democracy after the fall of the Berlin Wall. He
has continued democracy-building efforts
through work with the National Democratic
Institute. He was also co-chair of the Bipartisan
Working Group on Youth Violence and cochair of a bipartisan working group on continuity of government. Frost was a fellow at the
Institute of Politics at the John F. Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard for the fall
2005 semester and was named a Public Policy
Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars in January of 2006.
Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the U.S.
House of Representatives, is a senior fellow
at AEI and was a distinguished visiting
fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford
University. Gingrich is a member of the
Terrorism Task Force for the Council on
Foreign Relations and the U.S. Commission
on National Security, an advisory board
member of the Foundation for the Defense of
Democracies, and a member of the Defense
Policy Board. Gingrich also served as cochair, along with former Senate majority
leader George Mitchell, of the Task Force on
United Nations Reform created by Congress
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in December 2004. He is also an editorial
board member of the journal Biosecurity and
Bioterrorism and a contributor to Fox News
Channel. He writes a weekly newsletter for
Human Events and is a regular contributor to
the Church Report. Gingrich is the author of
seventeen books, including Drill Here, Drill
Now, Pay Less: A Handbook for Slashing Gas
Prices and Solving Our Energy Crisis (Regnery,
2008), and the New York Times bestsellers
Real Change: From the World That Fails to
the World That Works (Regnery, 2008),
Winning the Future: A 21st Century Contract
with America (Regnery, 2005), and
Rediscovering God in America (Thomas
Nelson, 2006). Gingrich is Chairman of the
Gingrich Group, founder of the Center for
Health Transformation, and General Chairman
of American Solutions for Winning the
Future.
Jamie S. Gorelick is a partner at
WilmerHale, an international law firm,
where she chairs both the National Security
Practice and the Public Policy and Strategy
Practice. Gorelick was a member of the 9/11
Commission and has served on many other
boards and commissions involving the
national security of the country, including
the Central Intelligence Agency’s National
Security Advisory Panel. From 1994 to 1997,
she was deputy Attorney General of the
United States, the second most senior position in the department, and before that she
was General Counsel of the Department of
Defense. From 1979 to 1980 Gorelick was
Assistant to the Secretary and Counselor to
the Deputy Secretary of Energy, and was
Vice Chair of Fannie Mae from 1997 to
2003. A highly recognized attorney, she
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served as President of the District of
Columbia Bar from 1992 to 1993. Gorelick
is a board member of United Technologies
and Schlumberger, the John D. and Catherine
T. MacArthur Foundation, the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, the
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and other non-profit organizations. She is
a member of the Council on Foreign Relations
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James C. Ho is the Solicitor General of
Texas. He previously served in all three
branches of the federal government as well
as in private practice. He was Chief Counsel
to Senator John Cornyn, who appointed
him Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee on
the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property
Rights for the 108th Congress, and Chief
Counsel of the Subcommittee on Immigration,
Border Security and Citizenship for the
109th Congress. He served as Special
Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General
for Civil Rights, and then as an attorneyadviser in the Office of Legal Counsel at the
Justice Department from 2001 to 2003. He
was a law clerk for Judge Jerry E. Smith of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit from 1999 to 2000, and Justice
Clarence Thomas of the U.S. Supreme Court
during October Term 2005. He is a member
of the Federal Judicial Evaluation Committee
which advises Texas’s U.S. Senators on judicial and U.S. Attorney appointments, and
previously served on the U.S. delegation to
the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination. He is also an adjunct
professor of law at the University of Texas
School of Law and a contributing editor of
The Green Bag.
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Fred Iklé is a Distinguished Scholar at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies
and currently engaged in studies about the
impact of technology on national security and
the prospects for democracy. He is a member
of the Defense Policy Board, a governor of the
Smith Richardson Foundation, a Director
of the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in
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of the Center for Security Policy. In 1988, Iklé
was Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
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Chairman of the Republican National
Committee’s Advisory Council on International
Security and, from 1979 to 1980, Coordinator
of Governor Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy
advisers. From 1973 to 1977, he served
Presidents Nixon and Ford as Director of the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Since 1988, he has been Chairman of CMC
Energy Services. He served for nine years as
Director of the National Endowment for
Democracy, and from 1999 to 2000 served as
commissioner on the National Commission on
Terrorism. He was Director and Chairman of
Telos Corporation and Director of the Advisory
Board of Zurich Financial Services. From
1964 to 1967, Iklé was a professor of political
science at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
Max Kampelman is currently serving as
Counsel to the law firm of Fried Frank Harris
Shriver & Jacobson LLP. He was appointed by
President Carter, and then reappointed by
President Reagan, to serve as Ambassador and
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Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
Kampelman served as Senior Advisor to the
U.S. Delegation to the United Nations, and from
1949 to 1955, he served as Legislative Counsel
to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey. From 1985 to
1989, Kampelman was Ambassador and Head
of the United States Delegation to the
Negotiations of the Soviet Union on Nuclear
and Space Arms in Geneva, before serving as
Counselor of the Department of State from 1987
to 1989. He was Vice Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the United Nations Association,
and is now Honorary Chairman of the Jerusalem
Foundation and Honorary Governor of the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His books
include, Entering New Worlds: The Memoirs of a
Private Man in Public Life (HarperCollins,
1991) and The Communist Party vs. The C.I.O.:
A Study in Power Politics (Praeger Press,
1957).
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach served first as
Deputy U.S. Attorney General under President
John F. Kennedy, then as U.S. Attorney General
from 1964 to 1966 and then as Undersecretary
of State under President Lyndon B. Johnson.
Following his government service, Katzenbach
served as Senior Vice President and General
Counsel of IBM Corporation. He left IBM in
1986 to become a partner in Riker Danzig
Scherer Highland & Perretti until 1994. Prior
to his government work, Katzenbach served in
the U.S. Air Force from 1941 to 1945. He
practiced law in New Jersey and New York,
and taught law first at Yale Law School and
then at the University of Chicago Law School.
He has published The Political Foundations of
International Law (with Morton A. Kaplan,
1961), as well as many articles for professional
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journals. He is active in the American Bar
Association and other legal organizations.
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*Participating as a commissioner on matters relating to the judiciary only
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of the National Academy of Sciences.

Senior Counselors
Norman J. Ornstein is a resident scholar at
the American Enterprise Institute. He serves
as Senior Counselor to the Continuity of
Government Commission and Co-director of
the AEI-Brookings Election Reform Project.
Ornstein is an election analyst for CBS News
and writes a weekly column called “Congress
Inside Out” for Roll Call. He has written for
the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall
Street Journal, Foreign Affairs, and other
major publications and regularly appears on
television programs such as ABC News’
Nightline, PBS’s Charlie Rose and The
NewsHour with Jim Lehrer. He served for six
years as a member of the Board of Directors of
PBS and is currently on the boards of the

13

Campaign Legal Center, the U.S. Capitol
Historical Society, the Center for U.S. Global
Engagement, the Washington Tennis and
Education Foundation, and UCB, a Belgiumbased biopharmaceutical company. His many
books include, Debt and Taxes: How America
Got Into Its Budget Mess and What to Do About
It (Crown Publishing Group, 1994) with John
H. Makin, Intensive Care: How Congress Shapes
Health Care Policy (Brookings Press, 1995),
The Permanent Campaign and Its Future (AEI
Press, 2000), and The Broken Branch: How
Congress Is Failing America and How to Get It
Back on Track (Oxford University Press, 2nd
ed., 2008), all three with Thomas E. Mann.
Thomas E. Mann is the W. Averell Harriman
Chair and Senior Fellow in Governance Studies
at the Brookings Institution. He serves as a
Senior Counselor to the Continuity of
Government Commission and is Co-director of
the AEI-Brookings Election Reform Project.
Between 1987 and 1999, Mann was the
Director of Governmental Studies at Brookings
and before that was Executive Director of the
American Political Science Association. He is
a recipient of the American Political Science
Association’s Frank J. Goodnow and Charles
E. Merriam Awards. His books include Vital
Statistics on Congress with Norman J. Ornstein
and Michael Malbin (Brookings Press, 2008),
The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing
America and How to Get It Back on Track with
Norman J. Ornstein (Oxford University Press,
2nd ed., 2008), and Party Lines: Competition,

14

Partisanship and Congressional Redistricting
edited with Bruce Cain (Brookings Press,
2005).

Executive Director
John C. Fortier is a research fellow at the
American Enterprise Institute. He has served
as Executive Director of the Continuity of
Government Commission since its founding in
2002. Fortier is also the Principal Contributor
to the AEI-Brookings Election Reform Project.
He is Director of the Center for the Study of
American Democracy at Kenyon College. A
political scientist who has taught at the
University of Pennsylvania, University of
Delaware, Boston College, and Harvard
University, Fortier has written numerous scholarly and popular articles. His books include
Absentee and Early Voting: Trends, Promises,
and Perils (AEI Press, 2006), After the People
Vote: A Guide to the Electoral College (AEI
Press, 2004), and Second-Term Blues: How
George W. Bush Has Governed with Norman J.
Ornstein (Brookings Press, 2007). Fortier writes
a column for Politico and is a frequent radio
and television commentator on the presidency,
Congress, and elections.

Assistant Director
Jessica M. Leval is Assistant Director of the
Continuity of Government Commission and a
research assistant at the American Enterprise
Institute. She graduated Phi Beta Kappa from

Preserving Our Institutions

Cornell University with a degree in Government
and a concentration in Law and Society. She
has held internships in the offices of Senator
Joseph I. Lieberman (D-CT) and William K.
Suter, the Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Leval has published articles in Roll Call, The
American, The Cornell Daily Sun, on Forbes.
com, NewMajority.com, and on the AEIBrookings Election Reform Project website.

The Presidency

Research Assistants
Molly Reynolds
Jennifer Marsico
Interns
Annabelle Burgett
Emily Lurie
Andrew Rugg

15

Scenario: Confusion

The President begins his State of the Union address promptly at
9:15 p.m., with the Speaker of the House and the Vice President sitting
behind him. Virtually the entire House and Senate are in attendance.
Five Supreme Court justices sit in the front row. With the exception of the
Secretary of Agriculture, the entire cabinet is present, since by custom, one cabinet
member is designated by the President and sent away to another location. Twenty million
Americans are watching the speech on television.

At 9:20 p.m., a passenger airliner takes off from
Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.
The pilot, an Al Qaeda sympathizer, diverts the
plane toward the Capitol Building, which is less
than three miles away. There is no time to intercept the plane, and anti-aircraft devices fail to
bring it down before it crashes into the Capitol.
Emergency personnel arrive quickly, but they
have difficulty reaching the House chamber.
First responders finally make their way to the
site of the crash and find many dead. Many
others must be buried beneath the rubble that
has collapsed upon them.
At 9:45 p.m., the military informs the Secretary
of Agriculture that there is no contact with
anyone else in the line of Presidential succes-
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sion. The President, Vice President, Speaker of
the House, and President pro tempore of the
Senate cannot be found. No one can locate any
other members of the cabinet, all of whom were
in the House chamber.
The Secretary faces a dilemma. If everyone is
dead, then he is to act as president of the United
States. There is no one else in the line of succession prescribed by the Presidential Succession
Act of 1947.2 Military aides are encouraging
him to take the oath of office so that he can begin
acting as Commander-in-Chief. But what if the
President is still alive or what if someone else
higher in the line of succession than the Secretary
of Agriculture has survived this catastrophe after
all? If the President were found alive and able,
2 Presidential Succession Act of 1947; See appendix II
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he could immediately resume his duties. On the
other hand, if he were found alive, but incapacitated, the Secretary of Agriculture would, by law,
act as president until the President were to
recover.
Exactly how and when power would be transferred from a disabled president to the Secretary
of Agriculture is unclear. The Constitution, in
the 25th Amendment, provides a detailed procedure for the Vice President to take over for a
disabled president if he and a majority of the
cabinet determine there to be a disability and
Congress is notified.3 But this constitutional
amendment does not apply to a lower level official taking over for a disability, nor if a majority
of the cabinet is not likely to be found alive.
Neither does the Presidential Succession Act
provide any details for taking over for such a
disability.
The lack of clarity would grow if another higher
ranking cabinet member were to be found alive
after the Secretary of Agriculture assumes the
presidency. If any one of the President, Vice
President, Speaker or President pro tempore were
to be found alive, it is clear that that person
would assume the presidency. But if the Secretary
of State, a cabinet member who comes before the
Secretary of Agriculture in the line of succession,
were to be found alive, there would be confusion
in the law. The Presidential Succession Act suggests that the Secretary of Agriculture would
remain president if a higher ranking cabinet
member were to recover from incapacitation.
The line of succession would pass by the Secretary
of State, and the Secretary of Agriculture would
continue to act as president.
3 Amendment XXV, United States Constitution; See appendix I
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A more confusing scenario would arise if
the Secretary of Agriculture were to assume
the presidency and it turned out that the
Secretary of State had been alive, but incommunicado. Who would be president – the
Secretary of State who should have acted as
president, or the Secretary of Agriculture, who
had acted as president for possibly days, or
maybe just hours, until the Secretary of State
was found?
The Secretary of Agriculture hesitates. Perhaps,
he thinks, this decision would be better made
when the rescuers have had more time to search
the rubble. But top military leaders encourage
him to take the oath of office. America needs a
president. Even a gap of several hours will not do.
Foreign leaders are already calling to inquire.
Foreign enemies might try to exploit the situation
by acting against the United States or engaging in
activities that the United States would not normally permit. Who would control the nuclear
codes if they were to be needed? Who would be
able to launch military action? “America must
have a president,” the military brass argue, “and
it must have one now.”
Despite this pressure, the Secretary waits, and
America is without a president. Finally, at
11:00 p.m., after calls from two former presidents, the British Prime Minister and the
Russian President, the Secretary agrees to
resign from his current office, as required by
the Presidential Succession Act, and take the
Presidential oath of office. The country is now
governed by a man with a narrow expertise who,
until yesterday, only a small percentage of
Americans could identify. After a short statement on television, the new Acting President
promises to speak again the following morning.
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Just after midnight, there is some good news. A
cry for help is heard in the rubble. Apparently,
a fallen section of the Capitol dome has trapped
some survivors, but spared them from being
crushed as most of their colleagues had been.
Fifty people are found in this section, but some
are dead, and almost all are severely injured. It
is clear that everyone else in the other parts of
the rubble has perished.
Rumors abound as to who is among the living.
One network reports that the President was
pronounced dead in the early morning. Another
network interviews a hospital worker who
claims to have seen him alive and speaking to
his staff in a hospital bed. Similar rumors
circle about the Vice President, the Speaker of
the House and other members of Congress and
the cabinet.
Over the course of the night, details emerge.
Miraculously, the President has survived,
although he is unconscious and fighting for his
life. The Vice President is not so lucky. She
succumbed to smoke inhalation shortly after the
attack. Perhaps the most remarkable case is
the Speaker of the House, who is injured, but is
well enough to sit up in his hospital bed and
hold conversations with his doctors. The
President pro tempore of the Senate is dead.
The others survivors include some staff, most of
whom are severely injured, and twenty members of Congress in addition to the Speaker.
Fifteen of those members of Congress are
unconscious and in critical condition, but four,
like the Speaker, have escaped with injuries
that are not life threatening. All Senators are
dead, as well as all of the cabinet members
present and the five Justices of the Supreme
Court who were in attendance.
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While there is much rejoicing that the President
is alive, he is unconscious, clearly not able to act
as president, and it is doubtful that he will survive. But the condition of the Speaker of the
House is more promising. He has painful injuries, but he is strong enough to act as president.
The Presidential Succession Act provides that a
Speaker of the House may “bump” out a cabinet
member who has assumed the presidency. At
noon, the Speaker of the House does just that.
The Speaker resigns from Congress and from the
Speakership, as the law requires, and takes the
Presidential oath of office. The former Secretary
of Agriculture, who served as president for thirteen hours, now holds no office, as he was
required to resign from his cabinet post in order
to assume the presidency. The Speaker of the
House now acts as president. America has had
three presidents within the past fifteen hours.
The Speaker is a more prominent figure than
the Secretary of Agriculture, but still relatively
unknown in the country. The most recent
Gallup survey showed that only 30 percent of
the American people had even heard his name,
and fewer knew his position. The Speaker, now
the Acting President, begins to respond to the
horrific attack on America. He orders immediate covert action against targets in the Middle
East and begins to plan for a major invasion of
two countries that harbor terrorists.
The Speaker has little or no Congressional check
on his actions. The Senate is completely wiped
out; no senators have survived. The 17th
Amendment allows state governors to make temporary appointments to fill Senate vacancies
until special elections can be held.4 In practice
4 Amendment XVII, United States Constitution; See appendix I
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that means that most states will send replacement Senators to Washington within a few days.
Preplanning by Congress also ensures that the
Senate will have an alternate location to meet
either in Washington or somewhere else, since
the Capitol building has been destroyed.
The House of Representatives is another story, as
the Constitution only allows vacancies to be
filled by special elections, and these elections
take on average four months to administer.5 The
Constitution provides that a majority of each
house is required for a quorum to conduct business.6 The twenty members of Congress who
survived the attack are far short of the two hundred and eighteen member majority. Following
the Constitution, there would be no Senate for
several days, and no House of Representatives
for several months, when special elections would
fill the many vacant seats.
But some of the handful of living and able members
of the House of Representatives have a different
idea. They know that there is a line of precedents
in the House of Representatives that defines the
quorum as a majority of those living, sworn and
chosen. This precedent was not established for
emergency purposes, but merely to achieve a
quorum when there were a couple of House vacancies and low attendance for a vote. Reading this
precedent literally, if only twenty members of the
House remained (which is the case) then only
eleven of them would be needed to establish a
quorum. In other words, a small number of members could function as the House.7
5 The Continuity of Government Commission. The Congress: Preserving
Our Institutions: The First Report of the Continuity of Government Commission, May 2003
6 Article I, Section 5, United States Constitution; See appendix I
7 The Continuity of Government Commission. The Congress: Preserving
Our Institutions: The First Report of the Continuity of Government Commission, May 2003
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At first it seems that this precedent alone will not
help the House, for though twenty members survive, only five are well enough to come to the
chamber. But these House members know recent
history. They know that the House codified the
precedent in its rules and added a provision to
allow for a quorum even with incapacitated members. According to this rule, which was viewed
as extremely dubious by constitutional scholars,
even the five remaining able members could act
as the House of Representatives, as long as three
of them came to the floor to form a “quorum.”8
If this handful of House members chose to exercise such a course of action, the House of
Representatives might exist in name, but it
would be a strange, unrepresentative, and in the
eyes of many, an illegitimate body. More troubling, it would also affect the line of succession,
for this small handful of members could elect a
new Speaker of the House, who would be in line
to be president should a vacancy arise.
In all of this mess, the Supreme Court is also effectively disabled as five of its members are dead,
and a federal statute requires that six members of
the Court constitute a quorum for issuing a decision.9 The circuit and district courts are intact,
but there is no court of final resort and no body to
resolve conflicts among the circuits.
So the former Speaker continues to act as
president with no Congress and no Supreme
Court as checks on his power. That evening,
he declares martial law to restore order and
8 See Williams, John Bryan. “How to Survive a Terrorist
Attack: The Constitution’s Majority Quorum Requirement and the
Continuity of Congress,” William and Mary Law Review, Vol. 48:1025,
pages 1066-1067
9 Title 28, Chapter 1, Section 1. Number of justices; quorum, United
States Code; See appendix II
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protect against subsequent attacks (although
many constitutional experts doubt he has that
power), and he puts the country on the highest
level of emergency preparedness.
With the country still in shock from the attacks
and from the subsequent confusion, two days later,
the President of the United States regains consciousness. At first doctors are cautious about his
condition, but after learning about the events of
the past few days, the President insists that he will
resume his office. After a day of recuperation, the
President, noticeably frail, goes on national television to announce that he has recovered sufficiently
to serve as president again.
The 25th Amendment provides clear guidance
that the Vice President will take over when the
President is incapacitated (either if the President
declares himself incapacitated or with the Vice
President securing a majority of votes of the cabinet), but that the President will return when he is
able. Almost everyone agrees that the President is
entitled to resume his office, even in this situation
where there is no Vice President, but the
Presidential Succession Act does not provide any
guidelines as to how this will happen.10

they apply to a former Speaker serving as acting
president.11 Furthermore, there is no cabinet,
and there is no functioning Congress. With
these issues and the fragile state of the national
psyche in mind, the former Speaker decides it
would be too destabilizing to publicly raise the
issue of the President’s ability.
In order to resume his duties, the President
issues a written declaration that he is recovered. He had considered addressing such a
declaration to Congress, but again the law is
vague and the Congress is not up and working.
After the written declaration is issued, the
former Speaker, who has been acting as president for three days, steps aside and he, like the
Secretary of Agriculture before him, no longer
holds any office due to his resignation from
Congress and the Speakership.

Amendment would allow a vice president, with
a majority of the cabinet, to challenge a president’s declaration that he had recovered and
was fit to resume the office, and the final dispute would be decided by Congress. But the
amendment says nothing about these powers as

The return of the President initially lifts the
spirits of the American people. The markets,
which had closed for two days after the attack,
and had declined sharply after opening, rebound
significantly with the news. But the initial
euphoria starts to ebb when the President
appears on television that evening to address
the nation about his response to the attacks.
Even the august setting of the Oval Office, perfect lighting and professional makeup cannot
hide the fact that the President is not well. His
frequent pauses, confusion over basic facts, and
general demeanor frighten rather than reassure
the American public. While few Americans are
willing to publicly voice their concerns, there is
growing sentiment that the nation might have
been better off in the hands of the Speaker of
the House or even the Secretary of Agriculture.

10 See appendix II

11 Amendment XXV, United States Constitution; See appendix I

To make matters worse, the former Speaker, who
is acting as president, has serious doubts as to
whether the President has sufficiently recovered to resume his office. Section 4 of the 25th
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But neither is eligible to return. They hold no
official position, and they are no longer in the
line of succession. In fact, it is not clear if there
is anyone left in the line of succession.
The unspoken concerns of the American people
prove to be warranted, as later that afternoon,
the President appears at a photo opportunity
with the Prime Minister of Denmark, who was in
the United States on the day of the attack and
who has not yet returned due to the paralysis of
the transportation system. At the photo-op, the
President turns pale, collapses, and is rushed to
a nearby hospital. Hours later, news comes that
the President has slipped into a coma and is in
critical condition.
Now, chaos reigns. Constitutional scholars appear
on television programs, and the initial commentary suggests the worst. There is no one left in the
line of succession. There is no one who can act as
president. The President is in a coma. The Vice
President is dead. The Speaker already served as
acting president, but does not hold that office
anymore as he was displaced when the President
recovered. The House of Representatives, by
most constitutional scholars’ views, should not
meet with only four members, and it will likely
take months to elect the two hundred and eighteen
members that the Constitution prescribes for a
quorum. Its four members, however, believe that
they have a quorum, and that they can elect a new
Speaker of the House, who by law would become
the new President.
The Senate has not reconstituted itself yet to
elect a president pro tempore, although it appears
likely that gubernatorial appointments will fill
vacancies in the very near term, and a new
Senate will meet. At that time, a new president
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pro tempore could be elected who would be in
the line of succession and who could then
assume the presidency. But for now, it seems
that there is no president, no Congress and no
Court. Who governs America?
After this initial bleak assessment, a few constitutional commentators note that perhaps there
is someone in the line of succession. Many read
the Presidential Succession Act to mean that
acting cabinet secretaries are in the line of succession, as long as they have been confirmed by
the Senate for secondary posts in the department. Each department has had someone in
charge since the attack as each has its own
internal line of succession. Most of the departments are being run by the Undersecretary or
other person in the capacity of “acting secretary.” Many constitutional scholars believe
acting secretaries are in the line of succession,
but there is significant dispute on this point. If
lower level cabinet members were unknown to
the American people, surely acting secretaries
rank even lower in their minds.
All agree that a more permanent solution is for
the Senate to reconstitute itself and elect a new
president pro tempore, who will then act as
president. Pressure mounts on a number of
governors who have not yet made appointments
to do so, and for the newly appointed Senators
to meet at an alternate location. It is likely that
these concerns can be resolved within 24 hours,
but what can we do now?
Intense interest centers on the Undersecretary
of State, who is serving as acting Secretary of
State. Again, the military makes the argument
that it is essential to have a president at all
times, even if it will likely only be for a day or
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two. Bowing to this concern and public opinion,
the Undersecretary resigns his position and
takes the Presidential oath of office. Governors
rush to make appointments to fill Senate vacancies. The new Acting President performs a
significant function by invoking a 1794 law that
allows the President to reconvene Congress in
the case of an emergency that prevents it from
meeting in its chambers.12
The five remaining members of the House of
Representatives begin to suggest that they do
not want the Senate to pick the new President.
All of the senators will be appointed. The
House is “the people’s house” and the remaining members have been elected by the people,
albeit their districts represent just over one
percent of the nation. If the House were to act
first in choosing a new Speaker, (before the
Senate can elect its leader) then that speaker
may act as president. But if the House waits
until the Senate constitutes itself, then the
President pro tempore will become president.
Twenty-four hours later, eighty newly appointed
Senators arrive at Fort McNair in Washington,
a location Congress had earlier designated as
a potential alternative meeting place. A few
states have not yet made their appointments,
but by the following day, there is a nearly full
complement of over ninety senators.
( Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Oregon, Massachusetts,
and Alaska have not sent senators because
their laws do not provide for temporary appointments, only elections, which will occur within
a few months.)13
12 CHAPT. XVII – An Act to authorize the President of the United
States in certain cases to alter the place for holding a session of
Congress. (Approved April 3, 1794); See appendix II
13 Article I, Section 3 United States Constitution; 2 U.S.C. Sec. 8. Vacancies; Amendment XXVII, United States Constitution; See appendix III
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With ninety senators, the new Senate goes about
its most important task, electing a new president pro tempore. In normal times, the President
pro tempore is an honorific position given to the
longest serving senator of the majority party.
The criterion for choosing the President pro
tempore always leads to the selection of someone with substantial experience, but sometimes
also results in the selection of someone whose
age and health would not allow him or her to
serve as president. In 2001, ninety-eight year
old Strom Thurmond served as president pro
tempore. In this instance, the Senate knows that
it must make a choice of the utmost importance.
Fortunately, one of the Senators appointed to fill
the vacancy is a distinguished former Secretary
of State who commands the respect of both parties. The Senate quickly coalesces behind him
and elects him president pro tempore.
Immediately after he is elected, he resigns his
office and his Senate seat and takes the
Presidential oath of office, displacing the former
Undersecretary of State, who is serving as
acting president.
Finally, it seems that there is some clarity to the
confusion of the past week, but there are a few
remaining issues. First, the President is still
alive, although in a coma and very ill. Were he
to recover again, he could displace the Acting
President again. Second, there is no functioning Congress. The Senate can operate, but the
House will not have more than a few members
for several months, and many are wary of the
constitutional fiction that a handful of members
might operate the body in the short term.
Without a bicameral Congress, there can be no
legislation passed, no declarations of war, no
appropriations, no legislative response to the
attacks as there was after 9/11. Third, the
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Supreme Court is decimated. The Acting
President could make appointments to the
Court and the Senate could confirm them, but
there are some questions as to whether an
unelected president should appoint five
Justices—for terms of “good behavior”—who
would shape the direction of the court for many
years to come.
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The President’s condition does not improve. He
dies two weeks later. Now the country knows
that the Acting President will serve for the three
years remaining in the presidential term. Four
months later the House meets again, having
filled its vacancies by special elections.
America is finally on the road to recovering
from the devastating attack on its leadership.
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Presidential Succession:
Is Our Current System Adequate to Protect
the Presidency Against Catastrophic Attacks?
Our system of Presidential succession is
governed by a number of constitutional and
statutory provisions. The original Constitution
authorizes Congress to write a Presidential
succession act, and we have had three in our
history. There are also provisions of the 12th,
20th, and 25th Amendments that affect succession. We are fortunate as a nation never to
have had a simultaneous vacancy in the presidency and vice presidency, but, unfortunately,
9/11 underlined the fact that such vacancies
are a very real possibility. If such a scenario
were to occur, we would have to test our various succession provisions laid out in the
Constitution and the Presidential Succession
Act. This section lays out the constitutional
and statutory basis of Presidential succession
and provides a brief history of how the current
system developed.

The Presidency

The Original Constitution
Article II Section I of the
Constitution
Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution contains the provision that undergirds most of our
Presidential succession system. The relevant
section reads:
In Case of the Removal of the President
from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or
Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties
of the said Office, the Same shall devolve
on the Vice President, and the Congress
may by Law provide for the Case of Removal,
Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring
what Officer shall then act as President,
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and such Officer shall act accordingly,
until the Disability be removed, or a
President shall be elected.14
This constitutional provision provides that the
Vice President should assume the powers of the
presidency if the presidency were to become
vacant. But, it also delegates to Congress the
power to specify a further line of succession if
both offices were vacant.
The language in the constitutional provision is
relatively clear, but a few details are worth
noting.
First, the framers recognized that there were
different ways that the office of the President
could become vacant–through removal, death,
resignation or inability. The first three involve
the President permanently vacating the office,
while the latter may involve a temporary
vacancy. In all of these cases, the Vice
President acts as president, and Congress may
provide by law for further provisions related to
each of these cases.
Second, the Constitution specifies that Congress
may declare “what Officer shall then act as
President.” The key is word “Officer,” capitalized in the Constitution. The term probably
means “Officer of the United States,” which
would mean officials in the executive, but
not the legislative, branch of government
would be eligible to be in the line of succession.
But the term has been controversial, and at
various times in our history, including today,
the Presidential succession act has included
congressional leaders in the line. A line of
14 Article II, Section 1, United States Constitution; See appendix I
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thought running from James Madison to Akhil
Amar holds that it is unconstitutional to
have congressional leaders in the line of
succession.15
Third, the constitutional provision allows for
Congress to make a provision for a special election to fill the presidential vacancy. There was
debate at the constitutional convention over this
provision, and the final language was agreed
upon that would allow a successor to the
President to serve either until the next general
election at the end of a term or until the completion of a special election provided for by law. In
fact, the first Presidential Succession Act
explicitly provided for a special presidential
election if both the presidency and vice presidency were vacant and the vacancies occurred
early in the term.

Congress’s Presidential
Succession Acts and the
20th Amendment
The First Presidential
Succession Act (1792-1886)
The framers recognized the importance of
passing a succession act, but they could not
agree on a specific statute in the first Congress.
It was the second Congress that passed the
first Presidential Succession Act. The most
divisive issue in the debate was the question of
whether congressional leaders could be
included in the line of succession. As a matter
15 See Amar, Akhil Reed and Amar, Vikram David. “Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?” 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1995-1996.
Pages 118-123
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of principle, the debate broke down into two
camps, one of which believed the word
“Officer” clearly meant “Officer of the United
States” and thus expressly forbade leaders of
Congress. The other camp argued that the
term was more expansive and included other
“officers,” and the President pro tempore of the
Senate and Speaker of the House are clearly
officers of the Congress. It was in this debate
that James Madison made an impassioned
argument that the Constitution did not allow
Congress to include Congressional leaders in
the line.16
But in truth, the real argument was not over
principle but politics. An anti-Jefferson faction wanted to ensure that Jefferson would not
be in the line of succession, while Jefferson’s
supporters wanted him to be in the line of
succession. Ultimately, the Senate was controlled by pro-administration Senators and
the first Presidential Succession Act was
passed with no cabinet members, and only
two Congressional officers. The law, which
would remain in effect for the next ninetyfour years, placed the President pro tempore
of the Senate followed by the Speaker of the
House.17 In this debate, Madison protested
bitterly, and his arguments were revived (and
ultimately accepted) in the debate over the
Second Presidential Succession Act in
1886.18 America fortunately never needed to
use its provisions, although in several
instances it came close.

16 See Feerick, John D. From Failing Hands: The Story of Presidential
Succession. Fordham University Press, New York, 1965. Pages 57-58
17 Presidential Succession Act of 1792; See appendix II
18 United States Congress. “Public Acts of the Forty-Ninth Congress”.
Statues of the United States of America. First Session, 49th Congress.
Washington: GPO, 1886; 1-2

The Presidency

The period from 1792 to 1886 saw the death of
four presidents, five vice presidents, the
extended incapacitation and eventual death of
President Garfield, the near removal of President
Andrew Johnson, and an election controversy
that was not resolved until two days before the
inauguration. There was no provision to replace
a vice president, as there is today with Section
2 of the 25th Amendment. If the Vice President
died or the President died and the Vice President
succeeded to the presidency, the President pro
tempore of the Senate was next in line to be
president. From 1792 to 1886 when the law
was in operation, there was no vice president
about a quarter of the time including a seven
year period during which there was no vice
president for all but one month.19
The President pro tempore of the Senate was
not selected in the same manner as today.
Today, the President pro tempore is an honorific position held by the longest serving Senator
of the majority party. In the nineteenth century, the President pro tempore was as the literal meaning of the title, “President for a time”
suggests, elected by the Senate to preside over
the body when the Vice President, who also
serves as president of the Senate, did not.
This meant that sometimes there was no president pro tempore and that no elected president
pro tempore would carry over to the next
Congress. Today, the Senate considers itself a
continuing body because terms of Senators are
staggered and roughly two-thirds of its membership continues in office at the end of each
two year election cycle. (The House, by contrast, ends after two years, and begins anew
with the next Congress.)
19 See appendix V
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Prior to the 20th Amendment, Congress was not
in session frequently. The original Constitution
called for the Congress to convene in December,
after the President had been inaugurated in
March. A new president might call the Senate
into session briefly to confirm cabinet nominations, but the Vice President would likely preside over that session. It was common for long
periods of time to pass during which there
would be no president pro tempore and oftentimes the President pro tempore from one term
would not serve in that capacity for the next
term. After the assassination of President
Garfield, there were significant periods when
his successor, Chester A. Arthur, served with no
one in line to succeed him. Consequently, in
the 1880s, Congress changed the act because of
the unstable potential for a change in party of
the President, and for constitutional reasons.

The first president to die in office was William
Henry Harrison, only thirty days into his term.
John Tyler acted as president for three years
without a vice president. Tyler himself was
nearly killed on a boat on the Potomac. An
explosion killed members of his cabinet –
Secretary of the Navy, Thomas Gilmer, and
Secretary of State, Abel P. Upshur.

Only eight years after the failed Johnson removal,
the United States had perhaps its most disputed
election. The 1876 election was the 2000
Florida election of its era, but it was more contentious and not decided until just before the
inauguration. Ultimately, an election commission was appointed that gave all of the disputed
electors to Rutherford B. Hayes giving him a
majority of the Electoral College. The final outcome of the election was determined only two
days before inauguration day. Had Democrats
been able to delay the counting of the votes for
two more days, there would have been no president-elect or vice president-elect to take office
on inauguration day, and there would have been
vacancies in the offices of President and Vice
President. In that case, the President pro tempore of the Senate would have taken office, but
there would be no president pro tempore for
months to come as the Congress would not have

Lincoln’s assassination left Andrew Johnson in
the presidency. Johnson was a Democrat, who

20 40th Congress 2nd Session Supplement Cong. Globe 410-415
(1868). Proceedings of the Senate Sitting for the Trial of Andrew
Johnson; See appendix II

Several incidents point out how close the United
States came to invoking the Presidential
Succession Act. James Madison served as
president at a time of great uncertainty – during
the War of 1812 when our country was invaded
by the British and Washington burned – and in
both of his terms Madison’s vice presidents died
in office.
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had run with Lincoln on a unity ticket. Lincoln’s
death occurred only forty-two days into his
second term, so Johnson would serve nearly
four years. Johnson’s presidency stirred up the
Radical Republicans in Congress. He was
impeached by the House and the Senate fell one
vote short of the two-thirds needed to remove
him from office. The Presidential succession
system’s flaws were evident in this instance. In
the Senate, the President pro tempore was
Republican Senator Ben Wade, who voted for
Johnson’s removal. Had one more Senator
voted to remove Johnson, Wade would have not
only voted for Johnson’s removal, but he would
have effectively voted to make himself president.20
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met until December. There might truly have
been no president for a long period of time.
In 1880, James Garfield was elected president.
The Republicans had been split into factions of
“Stalwarts” and “Half-breeds.” Garfield was a
“Half-breed,” but he selected the “Stalwart”
Chester Arthur as his running mate to mend
party differences. In September of 1881, after
only six months in office, Garfield was shot in
Buffalo by a disgruntled office seeker. The
assassin yelled, “I did it and will go to jail for it.
I am a Stalwart, and Arthur will be President.”21
After the shooting, Garfield was severely
wounded, but lived for eighty days. For most of
that time he was unable to exercise the duties of
President, although for a short period of time, he
did perform some minor official acts. At no time
did Vice President Arthur consider taking over
the presidency because of Garfield’s inability.

Arthur recognized this situation and called
Congress into session a few weeks later so it
could elect leaders to fill the line of succession.
Nevertheless, there were several weeks during
which the line of succession remained empty.
And later scholarship has shown that Arthur
was a sick man. He suffered from Bright’s disease and died at the age of fifty-six only one and
a half years after leaving the presidency.23
A similar situation arose four years later during
the first administration of Grover Cleveland.
Cleveland’s Vice President died and Congress
had not yet elected a president pro tempore or a
Speaker of the House. Again, there was no one
in the line of succession.

The Second Presidential
Succession Act (1886-1947)

The 25th Amendment, ratified in 1967, provides clear procedures as to how a vice president might take over and how the reins of power
might be returned to a recovered president.22
The constitutional language of Article II clearly
allows for a temporary takeover of the presidency, but neither it, nor any of the Presidential
Succession Acts that we have had, provide any
guidance on how it might happen. There were
some who mistakenly argued that a president
who was incapacitated would never recover his
office if the Vice President took over. Eventually
Garfield died and Arthur took over as president.
But at that time, there was no president pro
tempore of the Senate or Speaker of the House.

In 1886, Congress, shaken by recent instances
when the line of succession seemed less than
adequate, debated a new Presidential Succession
Act. The main reasons cited for a change were:
(1) the constitutional objection – raised by
Madison – that only those who hold office in the
executive branch could be in the line of succession and (2) the “party change” argument.
Leaders of Congress could be of a different
party than the President. This was the era of
party parity, not unlike our own. From 1876 to
1892, no president was elected with a majority
of the popular vote. In Congress, each chamber
switched hands several times, and there were
several instances where congressional leaders
were of the opposite party of the President; (3)

21 Feerick, John D. From Failing Hands: The Story of Presidential
Succession. Fordham University Press, New York, 1965. Page 118 and
The New York Times, July 3, 1881
22 Amendment XXV, United States Constitution; See appendix I

23 Feerick, John D. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Its Complete History
and Applications. Fordham University Press, New York, 1992, Pages
10-11
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the realization that there might not be anyone in
the line of succession at a given time.

for fourteen years in the United States) to succeed to the presidency.

Ultimately, the Congress decided to take congressional leaders out of the line of succession
altogether and instead to rely solely on cabinet
succession. The 1886 Presidential Succession
Act turned the presidency over to cabinet members in the order of the creation of their respective departments, which were Secretary of State,
Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of War, AttorneyGeneral, Postmaster-General, Secretary of the
Navy, and Secretary of the Interior.

The Second Presidential Succession Act remained
in effect for over eighty years, until 1947, during
which there were several succession crises. Grover
Cleveland had major surgery to remove his cancerous jaw and, unbeknownst to the country, was
temporarily disabled. William McKinley was
shot, and Vice President Teddy Roosevelt took
over. (This was months after one pundit said that
“there is only an assassin’s bullet between this
madman and the presidency.”)

The law included several other minor provisions. The 1886 Act did not require a special
election when a statutory successor to the
President takes office as did the first succession
act. It did, however, require the statutory
President (the Secretary of State or lower cabinet official who takes over as president) to call
Congress into session within twenty days so that
Congress would have the opportunity to provide
for a special election by law if it so chose.24

The most troubling succession crisis, however,
was that of the extended disability of President
Woodrow Wilson at the end of his second term.
Wilson had a stroke in October of 1919. For the
remaining seventeen months of his term, he was
hidden from view and, by most accounts, incapacitated. His wife and a close adviser effectively ran the government, as they were the only
ones who would “communicate” with Wilson and
report back on his wishes. Vice President
Thomas Marshall clearly indicated that he would
not challenge the capacity of the President. And
thus America existed for seventeen months with
a presidency that was effectively vacant.25

The switch to cabinet succession also stipulated that a cabinet member would be eligible
for the presidency only if he or she had been
appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Senate for the relevant position. (In other
words, no recess appointments or acting secretaries were in the line of succession). The
Cabinet member could also not be under
impeachment by the House at the time of the
vacancy. And finally, the Cabinet member
must meet the constitutional qualifications to
be president (to be a naturally born citizen, to
be thirty-five years of age and to have resided
24 Presidential Succession Act of 1886; See appendix II
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In subsequent years, Warren Harding died in
office, leaving Calvin Coolidge acting as president. A number of scholars believe that
Coolidge was incapacitated for significant periods of his second term due to serious bouts of
depression.26

25 Feerick, John D. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Its Complete History
and Applications. Fordham University Press, New York, 1992, Pages
12-15
26 See Feerick, John D. From Failing Hands: The Story of Presidential
Succession. Fordham University Press, New York, 1965. Pages 184-189
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The 20th Amendment (1933)
In 1933, just before Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
first inauguration, the 20th Amendment was
ratified. The Amendment called for a new inauguration date and a new meeting date of
Congress so that Congress would come into session to count electoral votes before the inauguration. The amendment also included two
sections relating to Presidential succession.
Section 3 makes it clear that if the Presidentelect dies prior to the inauguration, then the
Vice President-elect will be sworn in as president at the inauguration. It reads:
Section 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the
President elect shall have died, the Vice
President elect shall become President. If a
President shall not have been chosen before
the time fixed for the beginning of his term,
or if the President elect shall have failed to
qualify, then the Vice President elect shall
act as President until a President shall have
qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President
elect nor a Vice President elect shall have
qualified, declaring who shall then act as
President, or the manner in which one who
is to act shall be selected, and such person
shall act accordingly until a President or
Vice President shall have qualified.
Section 3 also stipulates that Congress might
specify who will succeed to the presidency if
the President-elect and the Vice Presidentelect shall not have qualified for office. This
allows Congress to provide for scenarios whereby
an election dispute prevents the election of
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either a president or vice president; the
President-elect and Vice President-elect are
killed before inauguration day; or, the more
unlikely case, if both have some other disqualifying reason such as they are not yet thirty-five
years old. In the Third Presidential Succession
Act (1947), Congress added the case of
“failure to qualify” as a possible condition for
Presidential succession.
Section 4 of the 20th Amendment reads:
The Congress may by law provide for the
case of the death of any of the persons from
whom the House of Representatives may
choose a President whenever the right of
choice shall have devolved upon them, and
for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose a
Vice President whenever the right of choice
shall have devolved upon them.
Section 4 allows Congress to provide for the
special case where Congress must select the
President because no one has received a majority of the Electoral College.27 Even though
authorized to do so by the Amendment, Congress
has never passed legislation to deal with such a
scenario.
In an eerie coincidence, just days after the
ratification of this amendment, President-elect
Roosevelt was riding in a car in Miami with the
Mayor of Chicago and others. An assassin shot
at the car, killing the Mayor. Roosevelt was
unhurt.28 Had Roosevelt been killed, the 20th
Amendment clarified that Vice President-elect
27 Amendment XX, United States Constitution; See appendix I
28 See Feerick, John D. From Failing Hands: The Story of Presidential
Succession. Fordham University Press, New York, 1965. Page 190
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John Nance Garner would have become
president.

Third Presidential Succession
Act (1947-present)
It is well known that Roosevelt was unable to
walk unassisted after an attack of polio. This
condition, however, did not limit him from vigorously carrying out the duties of the presidency.
Towards the end of his presidency, however,
Roosevelt was a very sick man, and there is dispute among scholars as to whether he was
impaired in his judgments at Yalta and in the
final months before his death.29
Roosevelt’s death elevated Harry Truman to the
presidency. Truman had served as vice president for only a few months when he became
president, and he and Roosevelt were not close.
It was only upon Roosevelt’s death that Truman
was informed of America’s project to build an
atomic weapon.30
Truman became vice president and then president after a long career in Congress. Shortly,
after assuming the presidency, he gave a speech
proposing changes to the Presidential Succession
Act. He argued that congressional leaders
should be higher than the cabinet in the line of
succession because they are elected rather than
appointed by the President and that a president
should not appoint his own successor.31

29 Feerick, John D. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Its Complete
History and Applications. Fordham University Press, New York, 1992,
Pages 15-17
30 See Feerick, John D. From Failing Hands: The Story of Presidential Succession. Fordham University Press, New York, 1965. Page 199
31 Special Message to the Congress on the Succession to the Presidency, June 19, 1945; See appendix III

32

The 79th Congress considered the matter, but
there was opposition. When Republicans
gained control in the 80th Congress, the Truman
proposal gained favor. Truman still stood by a
plan that would give the presidency to the other
party if the President had been killed (there was
at this time no vice president as Truman had
become president and there was not yet a
mechanism for appointing a new vice
president.)32
Truman’s proposal was for the Speaker of the
House and then the President pro tempore of the
Senate to be followed by the cabinet in the line
of succession. He also favored a special election for president if the vacancy in the presidency and vice presidency occurred early in
the term.33
Ultimately, most of Truman’s proposal—but not
the provision for a special election—was
adopted in the Presidential Succession Act of
1947. This act, still in force today, establishes
that, after the Vice President, the presidency
will pass to the Speaker of the House, the
President pro tempore of the Senate, and finally
to the heads of Cabinet departments in their
order of creation.34
The 1886 Presidential Succession Act similarly
extended the presidency to Cabinet officers in
the order of the creation of their departments.
However, the 1886 Act was not updated to
reflect the creation of new departments. The
1947 Presidential Succession Act included the
32 See Feerick, John D. From Failing Hands: The Story of Presidential
Succession. Fordham University Press, New York, 1965. Pages 208209
33 Special Message to the Congress on the Succession to the
Presidency, June 19, 1945; See appendix III
34 Presidential Succession Act of 1947; See appendix II
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heads of cabinet departments that had been
added since 1886. Subsequently, there has
been a tradition of amending the Act each time
that a new department is created to add the
head of that department to the end of the line of
succession. These small amendments to the
1947 Act are the only changes that have been
made to it since its passage.

Bumping Procedures
In addition to preferring congressional leaders to
cabinet members, Truman not only advocated
that these leaders be placed above cabinet members in the line of succession, but also that newly
elected congressional leaders be eligible to
bump cabinet members from the presidency.
The Act makes it clear that a president or vice
president who recovers from a disability or
qualifies for office (say a president elected after
a long election dispute with a Speaker of the
House serving as president for a time) may
“bump” out a congressional leader or cabinet
member who is acting as president.
But the Act also provides for the case where a
cabinet member acts as president because the
congressional leaders are dead or unable to
serve. Newly elected congressional leaders
may bump cabinet members who are serving
as president. For example, if the President,
Vice President, Speaker, and President pro
tempore are killed, the Secretary of State would
act as president.
But the Presidential
Succession Act of 1947 provides that if the
House of Representatives were to elect a new
Speaker or the Senate a new president pro
tempore, then one of those congressional lead-
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ers could bump the Secretary of State and
become president.
There is no provision for bumping a cabinet
member by another cabinet member, so if the
Secretary of Defense becomes President, a
newly appointed Secretary of State may not
bump him. Also, there is no provision for a new
Speaker to bump the President pro tempore.35
The bumping procedure is controversial. A
number of constitutional scholars believe it is
unconstitutional and others argue that it is an
unwise policy.36 As for its constitutionality,
the scholars point out that the Constitution
allows Congress to write a succession act
“declaring what Officer shall then act as
president, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a
President shall be elected” (emphasis added).37
Under the key constitutional provision, once
selected to act as president, the officer will
continue to act until the President’s disability
is removed, or, in the case of death or continuing disability, until a presidential election (either the next general election or a
special election for president).
The
Constitution on its face seems to stipulate
that once a person is deemed to be acting
president by the Presidential Succession Act,
he or she cannot be replaced by a different
person. This interpretation makes some logical sense as the provision would presumably
prevent the confusion that would arise if the
presidency were transferred to several differ35 Ibid
36 See Amar, Akhil Reed and Amar, Vikram David. “Is the Presidential
Succession Law Constitutional?” 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1995-1996 and
Fortier, John C. and Ornstein, Norman J. “Presidential Succession and
Presidential Leaders,” Catholic University Law Review, Fall 2004
37 Article II, Section 1, United States Constitution; See appendix I
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ent individuals in a short period of time. It
would also seemingly prevent Congress from
exercising influence on the executive branch
by threatening to replace a cabinet member
acting as president with a newly elected
Speaker of the House.

z

Any person in the line of succession must
meet the constitutional eligibility requirements for president (e.g., natural born citizenship) to assume the presidency.

z

Cabinet members in the line of succession
must have been confirmed by the Senate.
This means that recess appointees who
head cabinet departments are not eligible
to serve as president. The language in the
current Presidential Succession Act is
less clear than that of the 1886 Act with
respect to Senate confirmation. The 1886
Act refers to “such officers as shall have
been appointed by the advice and consent
of the Senate to the officer therein named…
.”38 The current act merely refers to “officers appointed, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate.”39 Read literally, this means that the current act allows
for acting secretaries to be in the line of
succession as long as they are confirmed
by the Senate for a post (even for example,
the second or third in command within a
department). It is not uncommon for a
second in command to become acting secretary when the secretary leaves office.
Though there is some dispute over this
provision, the language clearly permits
acting secretaries to be placed in the line
of succession. (We have spoken to acting
secretaries who told us they had been
placed in the line of succession.)

z

No cabinet member under impeachment of
the House of Representatives could serve
as president.

Additional Minor Provisions of
the Current Presidential
Succession Act
Several other minor provisions of the Presidential
succession act are worth noting.
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z

Speaker of the House or president pro tempore of the Senate must resign from his or
her office and from Congress in order to act
as president. This applies not only in the
case of the death of a president, but also in
the case of a short term incapacitation. The
Constitution requires that congressional
leaders step down from their posts in order
to assume any office in the executive
branch. The Presidential Succession Act
reiterates this requirement. After acting as
president, they cannot go back to their old
congressional posts.

z

Similarly, a cabinet member, in order to
assume the presidency, must resign from
office. This is not required by the
Constitution, only by the statute. Under
the Constitution, a member of the executive branch can hold two offices; a
Secretary of State could also hold the
office of Vice President. But the statute
expressly requires a resignation by the
Cabinet member.

38 Presidential Succession Act of 1886; See appendix II
39 Presidential Succession Act of 1947; See appendix II
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Eisenhower’s Illnesses, the
Kennedy Assassination and the
25th Amendment
After the passage of the 1947 Succession Act,
Eisenhower’s illnesses and President Kennedy’s
assassination spurred the enactment of the 25th
Amendment, which deals primarily with presidential incapacitation.
President Eisenhower’s several serious illnesses
sparked a renewed interest in the question of
presidential disability and succession. In particular, after a heart attack, Eisenhower drafted a
memorandum of understanding laying out in
significant detail how Vice President Nixon
should act, how power might be transferred to the
Vice President and back to the President.40 This
practice of issuing such memos was continued
under the Kennedy and Johnson presidency and
had some effect on the language of the 25th
Amendment, which was ratified in 1967, and
which provided for Presidential succession.
Congress wrestled with the issue of a constitutional amendment for presidential incapacitation
in the early 1960s. In particular, the issue
became a serious one for Senator Estes Kefauver,
and later Senator Birch Bayh, who chaired the
Subcommittee on the Constitution, a division of
the Senate Judiciary Committee which had constitutional amendments in its jurisdiction. The
assassination of President Kennedy hastened
work on the Amendment. In the immediate
aftermath of Kennedy’s assassination, there were
rumors that Vice President Johnson had been
killed or had suffered a heart attack. The death
40 Feerick, John D. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Its Complete History
and Applications. Fordham University Press, New York, 1992, Page 53
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of Kennedy highlighted the problem that there
was no way to appoint a new vice president in the
case of the death of the President. And with
Johnson’s prior heart difficulties and Eisenhower’s
illnesses, the issue of how a president might
transfer power in the case of an incapacitation
was rightly understood as significant.41
Ultimately, after several attempts, Congress
passed and the states ratified the 25th
Amendment. It reads:
Section 1. In case of the removal of the
President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become
President.
Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in
the office of the Vice President, the President
shall nominate a Vice President who shall
take office upon confirmation by a majority
vote of both Houses of Congress.
Section 3. Whenever the President transmits
to the President pro tempore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that
he is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, and until he transmits to
them a written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be discharged
by the Vice President as Acting President.
Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and
a majority of either the principal officers of
the executive departments or of such other
body as Congress may by law provide,
41 Feerick, John D. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Its Complete History
and Applications. Fordham University Press, New York, 1992, Pages
10-11
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transmit to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice
President shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the office as Acting
President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that no inability exists, he
shall resume the powers and duties of his office
unless the Vice President and a majority of
either the principal officers of the executive
department or of such other body as Congress
may by law provide, transmit within four days
to the President pro tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives
their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide
the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours
for that purpose if not in session. If the
Congress within twenty-one days after receipt
of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress
is not in session within twenty-one days after
Congress is required to assemble, determines
by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the
President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, the Vice President
shall continue to discharge the same as Acting
President; otherwise, the President shall
resume the powers and duties of his office.42
In a nutshell, the 25th Amendment achieves
two major objectives: First, it provides a mech42 Amendment XXV, United States Constitution; See appendix I
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anism for appointing a vice president if the
office is vacant. Second, it clarifies and provides specific procedures for the transfer of
power relating to presidential incapacity.
The vacant vice presidency had been a major
problem prior to 1967. Eight presidents and
seven vice presidents died in office, in each case
leaving a vacancy in the vice presidency. In the
178 years under the Constitution before the 25th
Amendment was ratified, we had more than 37
years without a vice president.43 Though the
United States would have faced problems of
Presidential succession had something happened
to the President, during all of those years without
vice presidents, the Presidents did not die, and
the successors listed in the Presidential
Succession Act were therefore not needed.
However, Congress saw that the United States
might not always be so fortunate in the future.
The 25th Amendment was for the President to
appoint a new vice president, and for the Senate
and the House of Representatives to confirm
the selection. It is the only office that requires
the confirmation of both Houses of Congress.
In the debate over the 25th Amendment, some
proponents believed that there should be a timeframe for the appointment and confirmation. Six
weeks from the date of the vacancy was commonly suggested as an appropriate amount of
time to appoint and confirm a replacement. In
the end, the authors did not include such a timeframe in the amendment, though many agreed
that six weeks was reasonable, given the need for
a robust line of succession.44
43 See appendix VII
44 Feerick, John D. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Its Complete History and
Applications. Fordham University Press, New York, 1992, Page 68-70
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The vice presidential replacement provision
was used twice shortly after the ratification of
the Amendment. Richard Nixon nominated
Gerald Ford for vice president when Spiro
Agnew stepped aside. Not long after, when
Richard Nixon resigned, Gerald Ford appointed
Nelson Rockefeller to the vice presidency. In
both cases the appointment and confirmation
process took longer than the presumed six
weeks – seven and a half weeks for Ford and
more than four months for Rockefeller.
While this provision has not been used since
the early 1970s, its initial use circumvented a
problem the framers of the Amendment feared.
Were it not for the 25th Amendment, when
Agnew resigned the Democratic Congress
could have been in a difficult position had
they proceeded with the impeachment and
removal of Richard Nixon. Carl Albert, the
Speaker of the House, would have known that
by voting to impeach Republican President
Nixon he would also be voting to install himself, a Democrat, in the presidency. In fact,
there were a few Democratic members of
Congress who urged Albert not to confirm
Gerald Ford so the Democrats could take the
presidency after a Nixon impeachment. Albert
declined to pursue this course of action, and
Gerald Ford was confirmed and would soon
succeed to the presidency.
The second issue addressed by the 25th
Amendment is clarification of how the presidency is temporarily passed to the Vice
President in cases of presidential incapacitation and how it is transferred back to a recovered president. The language of the original
Constitution is clear when it provides that
such a temporary transfer of power can occur.
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Article II section 1 contemplates that the Vice
President shall act as president in the case of
the President’s “Inability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of the said Office.” And
Congress may provide by law when such an
“Inability” occurs and the Vice President
cannot act. When Congress acts, the successor can act as president “until the disability be
removed.”45
Despite the Constitution’s relatively clear language, some believe that a vice president who
stepped in for an incapacitated president would
not return the power to the President upon the
removal of disability. Some believe that this
contributed to the reluctance of presidents and
vice presidents to transfer power for disability.
Take for example, the cases of Vice President
Marshall during Woodrow Wilson’s incapacity
and Chester Arthur during Garfield’s.46
Sections 3 and 4 of the 25th Amendment
describe the transfer of power. Section 3 is the
most straightforward. A president may indicate
inability in a written statement transmitted to
both Houses of Congress. Upon this written
statement, the Vice President becomes the
Acting President. The President can then
reclaim presidential authority by issuing another
written statement to Congress explaining that
his inability to perform the duties of the
President has been removed.47
The circumstances under which section 3 might
be invoked have arisen a number of times since
the ratification of the 25th Amendment. Most
45 Article II, Section 1, United States Constitution; See appendix I
46 See Neustadt, Richard E. “The Twenty-Fifth Amendment and Its
Achilles Heel,” 30 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1995, Pages 430-432
47 Amendment XXV; See appendix I
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commonly, this scenario arises when a president undergoes medical procedures that require
general anesthesia. Interestingly, there was
some reluctance on the part of several presidents to directly invoke section 3 of the 25th
Amendment, although there was a written declaration of inability. The formal invocation of
section 3, however, did occur in 2002 as George
W. Bush underwent a colonoscopy.
Section 4, which provides for the difficult situation in which the Vice President doubts whether
the President is able to carry out his duties, has
never been invoked. Hypothetically, such situations could be divided into two categories. In
one case, the Vice President, with the agreement
of a majority of the cabinet, declares the President
to be incapacitated, and the Vice President steps
in to act as president. This might occur if a
president were to have a sudden stroke, making
him unable to transfer power on his own. The
second, more contentious case would be a situation in which the Vice President and a majority
of the cabinet believe that the President is incapacitated, but the President disagrees. In this
case, Congress may have to resolve the issue,
with a two thirds vote of both houses required to
declare the President unable to perform his
duties and to install the Vice President as president for the duration of the disability. The most
likely scenario that would lead to such a procedure would be mental illness in the President.
Sections 3 and 4 of the 25th Amendment provide much more guidance than the original
Constitution as to the specifics of the transfer of
power relating to presidential incapacity. There
are, however, two areas not covered that might
arise, especially in the case of a catastrophic
attack on our institutions.
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First, if there were to be a temporary vacancy in
the Vice Presidency or if a catastrophic attack
were to create many holes in the line of succession, the process of transfer of power would
encounter additional difficulties. The 25th
Amendment only deals with the case of the transfer of power between the President and the Vice
President. In cases where the Speaker and
President pro tempore became acting president, it
would not be possible to easily transfer power
back and forth with the original President. As
members of Congress, these figures would have
to resign their congressional seats in order to
serve as president, even on a temporary basis.
They would not be able to go back to their positions after a president recovered. Cabinet members lower in the line of succession would face
the same problem, not because the Constitution
requires that they leave their posts to become
president, but because the Presidential
Succession Act does. Further, neither congressional leaders nor cabinet members in the line of
succession could invoke the procedure that
requires the assent of the majority of the cabinet
to declare the President incapacitated.
A second problem under section 4 arises if a
catastrophic attack decimates the cabinet. Then
no majority of a cabinet could be assembled to
assent to the Vice President’s declaration that
the President is incapacitated.
It should be noted that the original Constitution
does allow for the transfer of power in the case of
inability, so a transfer might be made, but without
the specific procedures of the 25th Amendment.
Also, the Succession Act itself could be amended
to spell out procedures for figures in the line of
succession other than the Vice President to take
over from the President in the case of inability.
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MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH OUR SUCCESSION SYSTEM

1. All the Figures in the Line of Succession
Live and Work in Washington, D.C.
The line of succession was built primarily to
deal with the death of a president, not a catastrophic attack on Washington. As such, with
the possibility of nuclear, biological or chemical
terrorist attacks, the whole line of succession
may become vulnerable. While precautions are
often taken to ensure that the President, Vice
President and other members of the line of succession are not in the same place at the same
time, most of the figures in the line of succession attend certain ceremonial occasions such
as the State of the Union and the Inauguration.
2. Congressional Leaders in the Line of
Succession
There are serious policy and constitutional
objections to having Congressional leaders in
the line of succession. The Constitution allows
Congress to specify which “Officers”48 shall be
in the line of succession, a term that almost
certainly refers to executive branch officials.
More broadly, there are structural considerations that make it difficult for Congressional
48 Article II, Section 1, United States Constitution; See appendix I

The Presidency

leaders to assume a position in the executive
branch. Congressional leaders cannot easily
step in for an incapacitated president, and they
may have conflicts of interest in an impeachment and removal scenario.
On policy grounds, Congressional leaders may
be of the opposite party as the President. A
political zealot might seek to change the party
in the executive branch with a single attack. A
freak accident might lead to a sudden change in
party; the death of President Reagan and Vice
President Bush could have led to President Tip
O’Neill. The death of President Clinton and
Vice President Gore might have led to President
Newt Gingrich. The situation becomes more
tenuous if the vice presidency has been vacant
for a time. Finally, in a catastrophic attack, the
presidency could shift between branches and
between parties, causing the makeup of the
legislative and executive branches to change
virtually overnight.
In addition, the so-called “bumping procedure”
allowing congressional leaders elected after an
attack to bump out a cabinet member who is
serving as president is especially troublesome.
As a result, the nation could potentially have
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multiple presidents in a short period of time.
And the problem of a party shift would only be
magnified if the new Congressional leaders are
of a different party than before the attack, and
these leaders might be of a different party than
the President.
In addition, the bumping procedure could allow
Congress to have undue sway over the executive
after an attack. For example, if the Secretary of
State were to become president, Congress could
threaten to replace him with its own leaders
unless he complies with Congress’s demands.
This would essentially eviscerate the separation
of powers.
3. The Order of Succession
The line of succession has a certain order to it,
with the Cabinet officials from the oldest departments earlier in the line of succession, at least
after Congressional leaders. But for years we
have simply relied on this formula without critically analyzing the logic behind the order
itself.
First, it makes little sense to include the
President pro tempore of the Senate in the line
of succession. While many figures in this position have been highly able, the criterion for
selecting the President pro tempore (the longest
serving senator in the majority party) ensures
that he will be of considerable age (ninety-eight
-year-old Strom Thurmond held the post in
2001). Aside from the age issue, the President
pro tempore might not truly represent his or her
party nor reflect the views of the majority of the
Senate. The Majority Leader would be more
comparable to the Speaker of the House
(although there are some difficulties in defining

40

this non-Constitutional figure) in the succession
statute. Alternatively, the position of President
pro tempore could be awarded on different criteria which would reflect the reality that this
person is three heartbeats from the presidency.
As for the cabinet, the Secretary heads of cabinet departments lower in the line of succession
are often picked with an eye towards special
knowledge of their departments’ policy areas,
such as agriculture or veterans affairs, or to fill
geographical, ideological or other criteria, but
not with the thought in mind that they could
become president.
Finally, even with respect to the heads of the
Big Four – the departments of State, Treasury,
Defense and the Attorney General, there is a
legitimate question as to what order should prevail in the line of succession. Should the
Secretary of the Treasury come before the
Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General?
Which secretary would be the most capable of
leading our nation in the face of a catastrophic
attack?
4. Acting Secretaries in the Line of Succession
The language of the current Presidential
Succession Act allows an acting head of a
department to be in the line of succession if that
person has been confirmed by the Senate for any
post whatsoever, not just for head of the department.49 In ordinary times, this might lead to
confusion in the line of succession. Would the
acting Secretary of State really be ahead of the
original Treasury and Defense Secretaries in the
line of succession? In the case of a catastrophic
49 Presidential Succession Act of 1947; See appendix II
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attack, this provision might cause even greater
confusion as departments have their own internal
lines of succession, and the death of the head of
a department might result in the automatic
ascension of an acting secretary. The acting
secretary might then claim to be in the line of
succession ahead of cabinet officers from other
departments lower in the overall Presidential
succession provisions.
Finally, the confusion over the status of acting
secretaries as opposed to original secretaries
would inevitably become an issue should an
attack take place around a presidential inauguration. Traditionally, heads of departments
resign just in advance of the inauguration of the
incoming President, leaving their department in
the hands of an acting secretary. In this case,
an attack around the inauguration would leave
the acting secretaries of the outgoing administration in place as the successors for the incoming President.
5. Incapacitation
The 25th Amendment covers many details of
how an incapacitated president transfers power
to a vice president. The amendment does not,
however, cover the case of a transfer of power
from an incapacitated president to other figures
in the line of succession if the Vice President is
not able to act. Though the Constitution gives
Congress the authority to enact legislation dealing with these circumstances, Congress has not
chosen to do so. The lack of guidelines could
lead to great uncertainty if a catastrophic attack
were to leave several figures in the line of succession dead or incapacitated.
The provision in the Presidential Succession

The Presidency

Act requiring cabinet members to resign their
posts to assume the presidency creates similar
problems. Congressional leaders in the line
must resign because the Constitution does not
allow individuals to hold posts in the legislative
and executive branches simultaneously. There
is, however, no constitutional reason for cabinet
members to resign; the requirement is purely
statutory. In the case of an incapacitated president with a cabinet member next in the line of
succession, the Cabinet member might take
over for the President temporarily, but then
would lose his or her post when the President
recovers. If the President were to slip back into
an incapacitated state, cabinet members who
had already assumed the presidency would no
longer be eligible to take over again because
they would have resigned their cabinet positions and thus removed themselves from the
line of succession. This requirement leads to
unnecessary confusion with an incapacitated
president.50
6. The Inauguration and Pre-inauguration
Scenarios.
Perhaps the most dangerous time for Presidential
succession is the inauguration of a new president, when the outgoing line of succession is
gathered together and the incoming line is not
yet in place.
Consider that both the outgoing and incoming
presidents and vice presidents attend the ceremony along with the Speaker of the House and
the President pro tempore of the Senate, proposed and announced, but not yet nominated
cabinet members of the new President and most
50 Fortier, John and Ornstein, Norman. “Presidential Succession and
Presidential Leaders,” Catholic University Law Review (Fall 2004).
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members of Congress. On January 20th at
noon, the outgoing President and Vice
President’s terms end. They cannot constitutionally stay on past that date. The incoming
President and Vice President will assume office
at noon. The Speaker and the President pro
tempore will have already assumed their positions when Congress convened on January 3rd.
The cabinet members’ terms do not end when
the term of the President ends, but almost all
cabinet members resign shortly before the
administration ends. Acting secretaries are left
in charge of the departments, and if they had
been confirmed by the Senate to fill lower level
positions earlier, might be considered part of
the line of succession in their current capacities
as acting secretaries.
The cabinet members of the new administration
are typically selected before the inauguration—
but not confirmed until afterward. By January
20th, the Senate will have held and completed
hearings for most of them. And all but one or two
controversial picks will likely be ready for an
immediate vote on the Senate floor as soon as the
new President takes office, officially sends their
appointments to the Senate, and the Senate
reconvenes and confirms them. This process can
be completed expeditiously, but even in the best
case scenario it still takes several hours. It is not
until late in the afternoon that the new President
has any of his cabinet confirmed. In 1989, the
Senate did not meet to consider nominations
until six days after the inauguration. So for a
period of hours and perhaps days, the new
President has none of his or her own cabinet
members in the line of succession.
If an attack were to occur at the inauguration
killing the incoming President, Vice President,
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Speaker and the President pro tempore, the
country would be left in an undesirable situation. Those who remained in the line of
Presidential succession would be the usually
inexperienced acting cabinet members, rather
than than the previous administration’s cabinet secretaries who would have likely resigned
on the evening of January 19th or early morning on January 20th. Alternatively, a handful
of surviving members of Congress could convene, choose a new Speaker, and have that
individual become president for the full four
year term remaining.
Depending on the time period during which the
dilemma occurred, the resolution would be left
to a different entity: the electors, Congress, or
the Presidential Succession Act. There are
three periods of time to consider: (1) the period
of time from Election Day until the Presidential
electors cast their vote in December; (2) the
period of time from the day that the Presidential
electors cast their votes until the electors are
counted; (3) the period of time between the
counting of the electoral votes and the inauguration.
Resolution during the third period is the most
straightforward as the President and Vice
President would already have been elected.
The 20th Amendment clarifies that if the
president-elect dies, then the Vice President
elect will become President on January 20th.51
If both the President-elect and the Vice
President-elect die before inauguration day,
then the Presidential Succession Act would
kick in, and the Speaker of the House would
become president.
51 Amendment XX, United States Constitution; See appendix I
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The first and second periods are more difficult to
address because arguably there is no presidentelect. In both the first and second periods, the
electoral votes have not been certified. There is
an official president-elect only when Congress
counts and certifies the electoral votes.
In the first period, if the President-elect dies
before the electors vote, the matter would likely
fall into the hands of the winning political party.
The Presidential electors tend to be obscure but
loyal partisans appointed as rewards for their
service to the political party. If the Presidentelect were to die, the political party would
likely instruct its electors to vote for the Vice
President-elect. Alternatively, the electors
could vote for the deceased President-elect –
and hope that Congress would count the votes
and declare the deceased President-elect to be
the winner with the Vice President-elect succeeding to the presidency. However, there is a
possibility that Congress would not count votes
cast for a deceased candidate, and the presidency could then end up in the hands of the
other party that had actually lost the election.
If both the President-elect and the Vice
President-elect were to die before the electors
cast their votes, the political parties would
likely have to instruct their electors to cast
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their votes for a new candidate. In this case,
the Presidential electors would end up voting
for someone who was not on the winning ticket
in the November election. While constitutionally legitimate, the country would face the
unpalatable reality that the President would be
someone who was not on the ballot and who
was picked by party insiders on a moment’s
notice.
The second period between the casting and
counting of the electoral votes is the most confusing. The candidates are not yet formally the
President-elect and Vice President-elect,
because Congress could choose to challenge or
discard votes or to find a result other than
expected. Yet since the electors have already
voted, the electors cannot revote for a partydetermined replacement for the deceased
President-elect. Congress might be faced with
a difficult choice. If it counts votes for the
deceased candidates, then it might be effectively electing its Speaker of the House to be
president, as the Presidential Succession Act
would kick in. Alternatively, if they chose not to
count votes cast for the winning, but now
deceased ticket, then the House would have to
choose the new president, only choosing from
the losing party candidates.
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Recommendations

1. The Presidential Line of Succession
Should Extend Outside of Washington, D.C.
Given the possibility of an attack with weapons
of mass destruction, it is essential that the line
of Presidential succession include at least some
individuals who live and work outside of the
Washington, D.C. area.
There are several ways to achieve this objective.
For instance, federal officials such as ambassadors and governors, perhaps in the order of the
size of their state or the creation of the states,
could be included in the line of succession as a
last resort. The Commission’s preferred solution,
however, is to create four or five new federal
offices. The President would appoint important
figures to these offices, and they would be confirmed by the Senate. The Commission envisions
these individuals would largely be former high
government officials that the President felt comfortable appointing such as former presidents,
former secretaries of state, former members of
Congress, or even sitting governors all located
outside of Washington, D.C. Though the
Constitution prevents presidents from seeking
third terms in office, former presidents are,
indeed, eligible to be selected in the Presidential
line of succession. Some states prohibit state
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officeholders from holding federal office, but
other states allow it. Sitting governors from the
states that allow dual office-holding could also
be considered by the President and the Senate.
These new offices would sit at the end of the line
of succession as a failsafe if a catastrophic attack
on Washington wiped out others in the line of
succession.
The Commission also recommends that only the
top four cabinet members be included in the
line of succession [See recommendation 4], with
the officers outside of Washington as last in the
line of succession instead of the lower profile
cabinet members under the current law.
It is important to keep these new officers informed
of matters that would be relevant if they were
suddenly thrust into the presidency following a
catastrophic attack. Lower profile cabinet members are not as a matter of course briefed regularly and thoroughly on national security matters.
However, these newly created officers would
presumably have high levels of past experience
that would help them in the position of President.
But in addition, the White House should strive to
include these officers in regular (at least monthly)
national security briefings, as a part of their
duties as Officers of the United States.
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2. Remove Congressional Leaders from
the Line of Succession
There is reason to believe that including congressional leaders in the line of succession may
be unconstitutional. If a Congressional leader
not from the President’s party were to assume
the presidency, it could lead to a destabilizing
change of party for the federal government.
Additionally, as outlined above, the inclusion of
Congressional leaders could lead to multiple
successors in a short period of time. American
constitutional structure makes the most sense if
Article I gives Congress the power to specify
which executive branch figures should be in the
line of succession.
Harry Truman felt that successors should be
elected officials and that a president should
not be able to appoint his own successors.
While it is true that Congressional leaders are
elected, they are elected only by their state or
district. The election criterion, powerful as it
is, is simply not compelling enough to outweigh the drawbacks, constitutional and otherwise, from having congressional leaders in the
line. For reasons of stability, it is preferable
that a president select successors who are
sympathetic to the party or standing agenda of
the White House and that the selection not be
made just by the President, but also with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
Excluding Congressional leaders would eliminate the possibility that the presidency would
shift to the other party if a catastrophic attack
killed both the President and Vice President.
It would eliminate the possibility of a rump
group of a handful of lawmakers choosing a
Speaker of the House who would then become
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president. It would also eliminate the provision in the current law whereby a subsequently
elected Speaker bumps out a cabinet member
who has taken over for the President. This
provision could lead to three presidents in a
short period of time.
Finally, the exclusion of Congressional leaders
would improve succession during incapacitation. If the presidency must pass to a
Congressional leader because of a temporary
incapacitation, then it would be very difficult
for Congressional leaders to step in for the
President. Unless the Congressional leaders
were willing to resign their congressional seats,
they could not take over the presidency. And
once they resigned, they could not reclaim their
seats unless they ran for the seat and won in the
next scheduled election.
The commission recognizes the political difficulty of removing Congressional leaders
from the line of succession. Short of excluding the Congressional leaders altogether,
four smaller steps might be taken. First,
Congress should remove the “bumping procedure,” by which a subsequent Speaker
could claim the presidency from a cabinet
successor. Instead, the law should allow a
living Speaker or Senate leader to take the
presidency if the President and Vice President
are killed, but if the Speaker and Senate
leader are also killed, then the Cabinet
member who becomes president should
remain president for the remainder of the
term, as the Constitution prescribes, and as
would increase the legitimacy of the succession in the eyes of the American people. (See
recommendation 3 on special elections. )
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Second, if Congressional leaders remain, the
current system of selecting the President pro
tempore should be changed. The most sensible
system would be for the Majority Leader to take
this place in the line. But the Leader is not an
officer of Congress the way a Speaker is.
Nonetheless, Congress could give its Majority
Leader the title of president pro tempore. Or it
could choose the President pro tempore on some
basis other than seniority in the majority party,
with an eye to who would be the best successor
to the President in a crisis.
Third, short of removing the leaders, Congress
should change the line of succession so that
the congressional leaders will only be in the
line of succession for the death of a president,
but not for the incapacitation, a scenario in
which their assumption would cause much
confusion. Congress could also choose to prevent congressional leaders from taking charge
in the case of impeachment of the President, a
situation in which some leaders might stand
to gain.
Finally, Congress should fix congressional continuity. As outlined in our earlier report,
Congress would face its own formidable problems in the event of an attack that killed a large
number of its members. In this context, the
reconstitution of Congress is also important
because the congressional leaders chosen after
the attack might succeed the presidency.
Congress should allow the appointment of temporary officials to fill vacancies in the House of
Representative so that Congress can continue
functioning after an attack. Also, the House
should clarify the processes through which
vacancies in the speakership are filled, keeping
in mind that a new speaker could automatically
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assume the presidency. If the speakership were
to automatically devolve onto minor members of
the House, America could see a relatively insignificant political figure elevated to the presidency. The House should ensure that no
individual will assume the presidency without a
vote in the full House of Representatives, not by
fiat or by the vote of an unrepresentative handful of surviving lawmakers.
3. Special Election for President
The Constitution allows for a special presidential election if the President and the Vice
President are killed. Similarly, the first
Presidential Succession Act allowed for such an
election. But subsequent succession acts have
not included such a provision. Congress should
reform our current law to provide for a special
election within five months if a simultaneous
vacancy of the presidency and vice presidency
occurs in the first two years of a presidential
term. Were such an election not to occur, the
interim successor should serve until the end of
the term.
4. Reorder the Line of Succession.
The order of the line of succession should be
reconsidered. Since the line of succession was
established by the 1947 Presidential Succession
Act, the only changes have been to add the
secretaries of the newly created departments to
the end of the line. In fact, all of the Cabinet
officers are arranged in the order of the creation
of their departments. While the chronology of
the creation of the departments might be a
rough guide to their relative importance,
Congress should not follow this formula blindly.
It should think again from scratch what the best
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order of succession is, especially considering
the emergence of the real possibility of a catastrophic attack on Washington.
The “Big Four” departments should then be
examined and reordered to best address a catastrophic attack. It is unlikely that both the
President and the Vice President would die simultaneously except in the event of an outside attack.
The commission therefore recommends that the
order of succession start with the Secretary of
State to be followed by the Secretary of Defense,
Attorney General and the Secretary of Treasury.
The commission also recommends that the
lower profile cabinet members be replaced by
the offices created for figures outside of
Washington [see recommendation #1]. The
lower profile cabinet officials are often picked
for their expertise in a particular policy area,
are less well known than the “Big Four” cabinet
members, and are less intimately involved in
matters of national security that would be paramount at the time of an attack.
5. Congress Should Remove Acting
Secretaries from the Line of Succession
The Second Presidential Succession Act (in
place from 1877 to 1947) explicitly stated that
only department heads confirmed by the Senate
for the position of department head were in the
line of succession. The current act, however,
can easily cause confusion as it allows for
acting secretaries who were confirmed by the
Senate for lower level posts to be in the line of
succession. The current line of succession is
also particularly ambiguous around the inauguration when a number of departments are briefly
headed by acting secretaries pending the con-
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firmation of cabinet secretaries in the new
administration.
6. Clarify Procedures for Incapacitation,
Especially for Lower Profile Officials in
the Line of Succession
A catastrophic attack may involve serious injury
to the President and the deaths of others in the
line of succession. While procedures for a vice
president taking over for an incapacitated president are well laid out by the 25th Amendment,
procedures for succession by lower officials are
not. Congress has the authority to legally prescribe the exact procedure for a lesser cabinet
official taking over for an incapacitated president. The law probably could not require the
lower level official to obtain the consent of other
cabinet members, as this is a constitutional
provision of the 25th Amendment provided for
the Vice President. But it could provide guidance as to how the transfer might take place and
how Congress is to be notified.
Further, Congress should clarify what would
happen if a majority of the cabinet were unavailable for the Vice President to consult with when
a president is incapacitated. Under a provision
of the 25th Amendment, Congress could specify
an alternative body with which the Vice President
could consult and obtain a majority in order to
take over the presidency. For example, Congress
could indicate that in case the Vice President is
unable to secure a majority of the cabinet due to
death or incapacity, the Vice President shall
secure a majority of governors or another body
outside of Washington.52
52 Fortier, John C. “President Michael Armacost?: The Continuity of
Government after September 11,” The Brookings Institution, Fall 2003 and
Fortier, John C. and Ornstein, Norman J. “If Terrorists Attacked Our
Presidential Elections,” Election Law Journal, Winter 2004, 3(4): 597-612.
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7. Fix Inaugural and Pre-inaugural
Scenarios
Congress and the political parties should take
preventative measures to secure the line of succession in the very dangerous times both during
and before the inauguration. Congress must not
allow a gap of even several hours during which
the line of succession for an incoming president
has not yet been established and the outgoing
president’s cabinet has resigned.
This could be accomplished simply through
cooperation between the outgoing president and
the incoming president – representing a mere
change in custom, rather than a change in law.
The outgoing president could submit the names
of several of the incoming president’s cabinet
nominees to the Senate and the Senate could
then convene and confirm these nominees on
the day before the inauguration or the morning
of January 20th. This way there would be an
established line of succession at the inaugural
ceremony. Additionally, several members of the
line might be sent out of town for the ceremony.
If recommendation #1, the appointment of officers in the line of succession who would live
outside of Washington were adopted, the Senate
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could also confirm these figures before the
inauguration, as the congressional hearings
presumably would have been completed in
early January.
The commission also recommends shortening
as much as possible the period between the
casting of electoral votes and their counting by
Congress. These dates are relics of an earlier
era when communications were slower and less
reliable than they are today. Congress should
move the date on which the electors meet to cast
their votes closer to January 6th, leaving at most
a gap of one or two days. This interim period
breeds confusion because there is no formal
president-elect, even though the electors’
choices are now obvious.
Finally, political parties should plan for the
possibility of the death of their president-elect
and vice president-elect. They should reexamine their procedures for selecting a new nominee to send to the electors in the event of the
death of a nominee. Such procedures should be
designed so as to make the selection of nominees as broadly acceptable as possible to prepare for the extreme possibility that both
nominees are killed.
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Conclusion

It is our earnest hope that events never transpire
that would put the presidency to the extreme
tests considered above. But, however unlikely
some of the scenarios we outline may be, the
paramount importance of the American chief
executive makes it incumbent upon us to ensure
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the office’s functionality even in the most dire of
circumstances. Leaving the American government vulnerable in the face of a catastrophic
attack – no matter how improbable a scenario
– is irresponsible. We hope our recommendations will be weighed with care.
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Appendix I
Constitutional Provisions
Article I Section V of the United States
Constitution

Article II Section 1 of the United States
Constitution

Section 5. Each House shall be the judge of the
elections, returns and qualifications of its own
members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day, and may
be authorized to compel the attendance of
absent members, in such manner, and under
such penalties as each House may provide.

Section 1. The executive power shall be vested
in a president of the United States of America.
He shall hold his office during the term of four
years, and, together with the Vice President,
chosen for the same term, be elected, as
follows:

Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two
thirds, expel a member.
Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may in their judgment
require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the
members of either House on any question shall,
at the desire of one fifth of those present, be
entered on the journal.
Neither House, during the session of Congress,
shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for
more than three days, nor to any other place than
that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
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Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a number of
electors, equal to the whole number of Senators
and Representatives to which the State may be
entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or
Representative, or person holding an office of
trust or profit under the United States, shall be
appointed an elector.
The electors shall meet in their respective
states, and vote by ballot for two persons, of
whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant
of the same state with themselves. And they
shall make a list of all the persons voted for,
and of the number of votes for each; which
list they shall sign and certify, and transmit
sealed to the seat of the government of the
United States, directed to the President of the
Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in
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the presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives, open all the certificates,
and the votes shall then be counted. The
person having the greatest number of votes
shall be the President, if such number be a
majority of the whole number of electors
appointed; and if there be more than one who
have such majority, and have an equal number
of votes, then the House of Representatives
shall immediately choose by ballot one of
them for president; and if no person have a
majority, then from the five highest on the list
the said House shall in like manner choose
the President. But in choosing the President,
the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each state having one vote; a
quorum for this purpose shall consist of a
member or members from two thirds of the
states, and a majority of all the states shall be
necessary to a choice. In every case, after the
choice of the President, the person having the
greatest number of votes of the electors shall
be the Vice President. But if there should
remain two or more who have equal votes, the
Senate shall choose from them by ballot the
Vice President.
The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall
give their votes; which day shall be the same
throughout the United States.
No person except a natural born citizen, or a
citizen of the United States, at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible
to the office of president; neither shall any
person be eligible to that office who shall not
have attained to the age of thirty five years,
and been fourteen years a resident within the
United States.
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In case of the removal of the President from
office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to
discharge the powers and duties of the said
office, the same shall devolve on the Vice
President, and the Congress may by law provide
for the case of removal, death, resignation or
inability, both of the President and Vice
President, declaring what officer shall then act
as president, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a
president shall be elected.
The President shall, at stated times, receive for
his services, a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the
period for which he shall have been elected,
and he shall not receive within that period any
other emolument from the United States, or any
of them.
Before he enter on the execution of his office,
he shall take the following oath or affirmation “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the
United States, and will to the best of my ability,
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of
the United States.”
Amendment XII
The electors shall meet in their respective
states and vote by ballot for president and
vice-president, one of whom, at least, shall
not be an inhabitant of the same state with
themselves; they shall name in their ballots
the person voted for as president, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as vicepresident, and they shall make distinct lists of
all persons voted for as president, and of all
persons voted for as vice-president, and of the
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number of votes for each, which lists they
shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to
the seat of the government of the United
States, directed to the President of the Senate
- The President of the Senate shall, in the
presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives, open all the certificates and
the votes shall then be counted - the person
having the greatest number of votes for president, shall be the President, if such number
be a majority of the whole number of electors
appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest
numbers not exceeding three on the list of
those voted for as president, the House of
Representatives shall choose immediately, by
ballot, the President. But in choosing the
President, the votes shall be taken by states,
the representation from each state having one
vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist
of a member or members from two-thirds of
the states, and a majority of all the states shall
be necessary to a choice. And if the House of
Representatives shall not choose a president
whenever the right of choice shall devolve
upon them, before the fourth day of March
next following, then the Vice-President shall
act as president, as in the case of the death or
other constitutional disability of the President.
The person having the greatest number of
votes as vice-president, shall be the VicePresident, if such number be a majority of the
whole number of electors appointed, and if no
person have a majority, then from the two
highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall
choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the
whole number of Senators, and a majority of
the whole number shall be necessary to a
choice. But no person constitutionally ineli-
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gible to the office of president shall be eligible
to that of vice-president of the United States.
Amendment XVII
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state, elected
by the people thereof, for six years; and each
Senator shall have one vote. The electors in
each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch
of the state legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation
of any state in the Senate, the executive
authority of such state shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, that the
legislature of any state may empower the
executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by
election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to
affect the election or term of any Senator chosen
before it becomes valid as part of the
Constitution.
Amendment XX
Section 1. The terms of the President and Vice
President shall end at noon on the 20th day of
January, and the terms of Senators and
Representatives at noon on the 3d day of
January, of the years in which such terms
would have ended if this article had not been
ratified; and the terms of their successors shall
then begin.
Section 2. The Congress shall assemble at least
once in every year, and such meeting shall
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begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless
they shall by law appoint a different day.
Section 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President
elect shall have died, the Vice President elect
shall become president. If a president shall not
have been chosen before the time fixed for the
beginning of his term, or if the President elect
shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice
President elect shall act as president until a
president shall have qualified; and the
Congress may by law provide for the case
wherein neither a president elect nor a vice
president elect shall have qualified, declaring
who shall then act as president, or the manner
in which one who is to act shall be selected,
and such person shall act accordingly until
a president or vice president shall have
qualified.
Section 4. The Congress may by law provide
for the case of the death of any of the persons
from whom the House of Representatives may
choose a president whenever the right of
choice shall have devolved upon them, and for
the case of the death of any of the persons from
whom the Senate may choose a vice president
whenever the right of choice shall have
devolved upon them.
Section 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on
the 15th day of October following the ratification of this article.
Section 6. This article shall be inoperative
unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the several states within seven
years from the date of its submission.
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Amendment XXV
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President
from office or of his death or resignation, the
Vice President shall become president.
Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the
office of the Vice President, the President shall
nominate a vice president who shall take office
upon confirmation by a majority vote of both
Houses of Congress.
Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and
until he transmits to them a written declaration
to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice President as acting
president.
Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a
majority of either the principal officers of the
executive departments or of such other body as
Congress may by law provide, transmit to the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their
written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
the Vice President shall immediately assume
the powers and duties of the office as acting
president.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that no inability exists, he
shall resume the powers and duties of his
office unless the Vice President and a majority
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of either the principal officers of the executive
department or of such other body as Congress
may by law provide, transmit within four days
to the President pro tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives
their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide
the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours
for that purpose if not in session. If the
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Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt
of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress
is not in session, within twenty-one days after
Congress is required to assemble, determines
by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the
President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, the Vice President
shall continue to discharge the same as acting
President; otherwise, the President shall
resume the powers and duties of his office.
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Appendix II
Congressional Provisions
United States Code, Title 28, Chapter 1,
Section 1. Number of justices; quorum
The Supreme Court of the United States shall
consist of a Chief Justice of the United States
and eight associate justices, any six of whom
shall constitute a quorum.
Presidential Succession Act of 1792
1) Vice President
2) President of the Senate pro tempore
3) Speaker of the House of Representatives
4) [Special Election for President]
CHAP. VIII. An act relative to the Election of a
President and Vice President of the United States,
and declaring the Officer who shall act as
President in case if Vacancies in the offices both
of President and Vice President. (March 1, 1792)
SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That except in
case of an election of a President and Vice
President of the United States, prior to the ordinary period as herein after specified, electors
shall be appointed in each state for the election
of a President and Vice President of the United
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States, within thirty-four days preceding the first
Wednesday in December, one thousand seven
hundred and ninety-two, and within thirty-four
days preceding the first Wednesday in December
in every fourth year succeeding the last election,
which electors shall be equal to the number of
Senators and Representatives, to which the several states may by law be entitled at the time,
when the President and Vice President, thus to
be chosen, should come into office: Provided
always, That where no apportionment of
Representatives shall have been made after any
enumeration, at the time of choosing electors,
then the number of electors shall be according to
the existing apportionment of Senators and
Representatives.
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the
electors shall meet and give their votes on the
said first Wednesday in December, at such
place in each state as shall be directed, by the
legislature thereof; and the electors in each
state shall make and sign three certificates of all
the votes by them given, and shall seal up the
same certifying on each that a list of the votes of
such state for President and Vice President is
contained therein, and shall by writing under
their hands, or under the hands of a majority of
them, appoint a person to take charge of and
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deliver to the President of the Senate, at the
seat of government, before the first Wednesday
in January then next ensuing, one of the said
certificates, and the said electors shall forthwith
forward by the post-office to the President of the
Senate, at the seat of government, one other of
the said certificates, and shall forthwith cause
the other of the said certificates to be delivered
to the judge of that district in which the said
electors shall assemble.
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That the
executive authority of each state shall cause
three lists of the names of the electors of such
state to be made and certified and to be delivered to the electors on or before the said first
Wednesday in December, and the said electors
shall annex one of the said lists to each of the
lists of their votes.
SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That if a list
of votes, from any state, shall not have been
received at the seat of government on the said
first Wednesday in January, that then the
Secretary of State shall send a special messenger to the district judge in whose custody such
list shall have been lodged, who shall forthwith
transmit the same to the seat of government.
SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That Congress
shall be in session on the second Wednesday in
February, one thousand seven hundred and
ninety-three, and on the second Wednesday in
February succeeding every meeting of the electors, and the said certificates, or so many of
them as shall have been received, shall then be
opened, the votes counted, and the persons who
shall fill the offices of President and Vice
President ascertained and declared, agreeably
to the constitution.
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SEC. 6. And be it further enacted, That in case
there shall be no President of the Senate at the
seat of government on the arrival of the persons
entrusted with the lists of the votes of the electors,
then such persons shall deliver the lists of votes in
their custody into the office of the Secretary of
State, to be safely kept and delivered over as soon
as may be, to the President of the Senate.
SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, That the
persons appointed by the electors to deliver the
lists of votes to the President of the Senate,
shall be allowed on the delivery of the said lists
twenty-five cents for every mile of the estimated
distance by the most usual road, from the place
of meeting of the electors, to the seat of government of the United States.
SEC. 8. And be it further enacted, That if any
person appointed to deliver the votes of the electors to the President of the Senate, shall after
accepting of his appointment neglect to perform
the services required of him by this act, he shall
forfeit the sum of one thousand dollars.
SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, That in case
of removal, death, resignation or inability both of
the President and Vice President of the United
States, the President of the Senate pro tempore,
and in case there shall be no President of the
Senate, then the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, for the time being shall act as
President of the United States until the disability
be removed or a President shall be elected.
SEC. 10. And be it further enacted, That whenever the offices of President and Vice President
shall both become vacant, the Secretary of State
shall forthwith cause a notification thereof to be
made to the executive of every state, and shall also

59

cause the same to be published in at least one of
the newspapers printed in each state, specifying
that electors of the President of the United States
shall be appointed or chosen in the several states
within thirty-four days preceding the first
Wednesday in December then next ensuing:
Provided, There shall be the space of two months
between the date of such notification and the said
first Wednesday in December, but if there shall
not be the space of two months between the date
of such notification and the first Wednesday in
December; and if the term for which the President
and Vice President last in office were elected shall
not expire on the third day of March next ensuing,
then the Secretary of State shall specify in the
notification that the electors shall be appointed or
chosen within thirty-four days preceding the first
Wednesday in December in the year next ensuing,
within which time the electors shall accordingly
be appointed or chosen, and the electors shall
meet and give their votes on the said first
Wednesday in December, and the proceedings
and duties of the said electors and others shall be
pursuant to the directions prescribed in this act.
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CHAPT. XVII – An Act to authorize the
President of the United States in certain
cases to alter the place for holding a session
of Congress. (Approved April 3, 1794)
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in
congress assembled, That whenever the Congress
shall be about to convene, and, from the prevalence of contagious sickness, or the existence of
other circumstances, it would in the opinion of the
President of the United States, be hazardous to the
lives or health of the members to meet at the place
to which the Congress shall then stand adjourned,
or at which it shall be next by law to meet, the
President shall be, and he hereby is authorized, by
proclamation, to convene the Congress at such
other place as he may judge proper.
Presidential Succession Act of 1886

1) Vice President
2) Secretary of State
3) Secretary of Treasury
4) Secretary of War
5) Attorney-General
6) Postmaster-General
7) Secretary of the Navy
8) Secretary of the Interior

SEC. 11. And be it further enacted, That the
only evidence of refusal to accept or of a resignations of the Office of President and Vice
President, shall be an instrument in writing
declaring the same, and sub-scribed by the
person refusing to accept or resigning, as the
case may be, and delivered into the office of the
Secretary of State.

CHAP. 4.- An act to provide for the performance
of the duties of tie office of President in case of the
removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the
President and Vice-President. - Jan 19, 1886.

SEC. 12. And be it further enacted, That the
term of four years for which a President and
Vice President shall be elected shall in all
cases commence on the fourth day of March
next succeeding the day on which the votes of
the electors shall have been given.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, That in case of removal,
death, resignation, or inability of both the President
and Vice-President of the United States, the
Secretary of State, or if there be none, or in case of
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his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then
the Secretary of Treasury, or if there be none, or in
case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability,
then the Secretary of War, or if there be none, or in
case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability,
then the Attorney-General, or if there be none, or
in case of his removal, death, resignation, or
inability, then the Postmaster-General, or if there
be none, or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the Secretary of the Navy, or
if there be none, or in case of his removal, death,
resignation, or inability, then the Secretary of the
Interior, shall act as President until the disability
of the President or Vice-President is removed or a
President shall be elected: Provided, That whenever the powers and duties of the office of President
of the United States shall devolve upon any of the
persons named herein, if Congress be not then in
session, or if it would not meet in accordance with
law within twenty days thereafter, it shall be the
duty of the person upon whom said powers and
duties shall devolve to issue a proclamation convening Congress ‘in extraordinary session, giving
twenty days’ notice of the time of meeting.
SEC. 2. That the preceding section shall only be
held to describe and apply to such officers as shall
have been appointed by the advice and consent of
the Senate to the offices therein named, and such
as are eligible to the office of President under the
Constitution and not under impeachment by the
House of Representatives of the United States at
the time the powers and duties of the office shall
devolve upon them respectively.
SEC. 3. That sections one hundred and forty-six,
one hundred and forty-seven, one hundred and
forty-eight, one hundred and forty-nine and one
hundred and fifty of the Revised Statutes are
hereby repealed.
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Presidential Succession Act of 1947 (as
amended through 2002)
1) Vice President
2) Speaker of the House
3) President pro tempore
4) Secretary of State
5) Secretary of the Treasury
6) Secretary of Defense
7) Attorney General
8) Secretary of the Interior
9) Secretary of Agriculture
10) Secretary of Commerce
11) Secretary of Labor
12) Secretary of Health and Human Services
13) Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development
14) Secretary of Transportation
15) Secretary of Energy
16) Secretary of Education
17) Secretary of Veterans Affairs
18) Secretary of Homeland Security
SEC 19. Vacancy in offices of both President
and Vice President; officers eligible to act
(a)(1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal
from office, inability, or failure to qualify, there
is neither a President nor Vice President to
discharge the powers and duties of the office of
President, then the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall, upon his resignation as
Speaker and as Representative in Congress, act
as President.
(2) The same rule shall apply in the case of
the death, resignation, removal from office,
or inability of an individual acting as
President under this subsection.
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(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) of
this section a Speaker is to begin the discharge
of the powers and duties of the office of
President, there is no Speaker, or the Speaker
fails to qualify as Acting President, then the
President pro tempore of the Senate shall, upon
his resignation as President pro tempore and as
Senator, act as President.
(c) An individual acting as President under
subsection (a) or subsection (b) of this section
shall continue to act until the expiration of the
then current Presidential term, except that(1) if his discharge of the powers and duties
of the office is founded in whole or in part
on the failure of both the President-elect
and the Vice-President-elect to qualify,
then he shall act only until a President or
Vice President qualifies; and
(2) if his discharge of the powers and duties of
the office is founded in whole or in part on the
inability of the President or Vice President,
then he shall act only until the removal of the
disability of one of such individuals.
(d)(1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal
from office, inability, or failure to qualify, there is
no President pro tempore to act as President
under subsection (b) of this section, then the
officer of the United States who is highest on the
following list, and who is not under disability to
discharge the powers and duties of the office of
President shall act as President: Secretary of
State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of
Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the
Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of
Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of
Health and Human Services, Secretary of
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Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of
Transportation, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of
Education, Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
Secretary of Homeland Security.
(2) An individual acting as President under
this subsection shall continue so to do until
the expiration of the then current Presidential
term, but not after a qualified and priorentitled individual is able to act, except that
the removal of the disability of an individual
higher on the list contained in paragraph (1)
of this subsection or the ability to qualify on
the part of an individual higher on such list
shall not terminate his service.
(3) The taking of the oath of office by an
individual specified in the list in paragraph
(1) of this subsection shall be held to constitute his resignation from the office by
virtue of the holding of which he qualifies
to act as President.
(e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section
shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to
the office of President under the Constitution.
Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only to
officers appointed, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the
death, resignation, removal from office, inability,
or failure to qualify, of the President pro tempore,
and only to officers not under impeachment by
the House of Representatives at the time the
powers and duties of the office of President
devolve upon them.
(f) During the period that any individual acts as
President under this section, his compensation
shall be at the rate then provided by law in the
case of the President.
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Appendix III
Federal Provisions for Filling Senate Vacancies
U.S. Constitution, Article I Section 3
…if vacancies happen by resignation, or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of
any state, the executive thereof may make
temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill
such vacancies.
U.S. Constitution, 17th Amendment
When vacancies happen in the representation
of any state in the Senate, the executive authority of such state shall issue writs of election to
fill such vacancies: Provided, that the legisla-
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ture of any state may empower the executive
thereof to make temporary appointments until
the people fill the vacancies by election as the
legislature may direct.
2 U.S.C. Sec. 8. Vacancies
The time for holding elections in any State,
district, or territory for a Representative or
Delegate to fill a vacancy, whether such
vacancy is caused by a failure to elect at the
time prescribed by law, or by the death, resignation, or incapacity of a person elected, may
be prescribed by the laws of the several States
and territories respectively.
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Appendix IV
President Truman’s Special Message to the
Congress on the Succession to the Presidency,
June 19, 1945
To the Congress of the United States:
I think that this is an appropriate time for the
Congress to reexamine the question of the
Presidential succession.
The question is of great importance now because
there will be no elected Vice President for
almost four years.
The existing statute governing the succession to
the office of President was enacted in 1886.
Under it, in the event of the death of the elected
President and Vice President, members of the
Cabinet successively fill the office.
Each of these Cabinet members is appointed
by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate. In effect, therefore, by reason
of the tragic death of the late President, it
now lies within my power to nominate the
person who would be my immediate successor
in the event of my own death or inability
to act.
I do not believe that in a democracy this power
should rest with the Chief Executive.
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In so far as possible, the office of the President
should be filled by an elective officer. There is
no officer in our system of government, besides
the President and Vice President, who has been
elected by all the voters of the country.
The Speaker of the House of Representatives,
who is elected in his own district, is also elected
to be the presiding officer of the House by a
vote of all the Representatives of all the people
of the country. As a result, I believe that the
Speaker is the official in the Federal Government,
whose selection next to that of the President and
Vice President, can be most accurately said to
stem from the people themselves.
Under the law of 1792, the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate followed the Vice
President in the order of succession.
The President Pro Tempore is elected as a
Senator by his State and then as presiding officer by the Senate. But the members of the
Senate are not as closely tied in by the elective
process to the people as are the members of the
House of Representatives. A completely new
House is elected every two years, and always at
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the same time as the President and Vice
President. Usually it is in agreement politically
with the Chief Executive.
Only one third of the Senate, however, is elected
with the President and Vice President. The Senate
might, therefore, have a majority hostile to the
policies of the President, and might conceivably
fill the Presidential office with one not in sympathy with the will of the majority of the people.
Some of the events in the impeachment proceedings of President Johnson suggested the
possibility of a hostile Congress in the future
seeking to oust a Vice President who had
become President, in order to have the President
Pro Tempore of the Senate become the President.
This was one of the considerations, among several others, which led to the change in 1886.

Representatives first in order of succession in
case of the removal, death, resignation or
inability to act of the President and Vice
President. Of course, the Speaker should resign
as a Representative in the Congress as well as
Speaker of the House before he assumes the
office of President.
If there is no qualified Speaker, or if the Speaker
fails to qualify, then I recommend that the succession pass to the President Pro Tempore of
the Senate, who should hold office until a duly
qualified Speaker is elected.
If there be neither Speaker nor President Pro
Tempore qualified to succeed on the creation of
the vacancy, then the succession might pass to
the members of the Cabinet as now provided,
until a duly qualified Speaker is elected.

No matter who succeeds to the Presidency after
the death of the elected President and Vice
President, it is my opinion he should not serve
any longer than until the next Congressional
election or until a special election called for the
purpose of electing a new President and Vice
President. This period the Congress should fix.
The individuals elected at such general or special election should then serve only to fill the
unexpired term of the deceased President and
Vice President. In this way there would be no
interference with the normal four-year interval
of general national elections.

If the Congress decides that a special election
should be held, then I recommend that it provide for such election to be held as soon after
the death or disqualification of the President
and Vice President as practicable. The method
and procedure for holding such special election
should be provided now by law, so that the election can be held as expeditiously as possible
should the contingency arise.

I recommend, therefore, that the Congress enact
legislation placing the Speaker of the House of

HARRY S. TRUMAN
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In the interest of orderly, democratic government, I urge the Congress to give its early
consideration to this most important subject.
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Appendix V
Presidential Deaths in Office
Term for
Which
Elected

Death

Vice
Presidential
Successor

Date
Presidential
Oath Taken

Remaining
Term

William H. Harrison

March 4,
1841-1845

April 4,
1841

John Tyler

April 6, 1841

3 years, 11
months

Zachary Taylor

March 4,
1849-1853

July 9, 1850

Millard Fillmore

July 10, 1850

2 years, 7
months, 23 days

Abraham Lincoln

March 4,
1865-1869

April 15,
1865

Andrew
Johnson

April 15, 1865

3 years, 10
months, 17 days

James A. Garfield

March 4,
1881-1885

September
19, 1881

Chester A.
Arthur

September 20
and 22, 1881

3 years, 5
months, 13 days

William McKinley

March 4,
1901-1905

September
14, 1901

Theodore
Roosevelt

September 14,
1901

3 years, 5
months, 18 days

Warren G. Harding

March 4,
1921-1925

August 2,
1923

Calvin Coolidge

August 3 and
21, 1923

1 year, 7 months,
2 days

Franklin D. Roosevelt

January 20,
1945-1949

April 12,
1945

Harry S.
Truman

April 15, 1945

3 years, 9
months, 29 days

John F. Kennedy

January 20,
1961-1965

November
22, 1963

Lyndon B.
Johnson

November 22,
1963

1 year, 1 month,
29 days

President

Source: Feerick, John D. From Failing Hands: The Story of Presidential Succession, Fordham University Press, New
York, 1965 (Reprinted with slight modifications with permission from the author).
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Appendix VI
Vice Presidential Vacancies
Vice
President

Period For Which
Elected

George
Clinton
Elbridge
Gerry
John C.
Calhoun

Termination of
Service

Reason for
Termination

Length of VicePresidential Vacancy

March 4, 1809-1813

April 20, 1812

Death

0 years, 10 months, 12 days

March 4, 1813-1817

November 23, 1814

Death

2 years, 3 months, 9 days

March 4, 1829-1833

December 28, 1832

Resignation

0 years, 2 months, 4 days

John Tyler

March 4, 1841-1845

April 4, 1841

Succession

3 years, 11 months, 0 days

Millard
Fillmore
William R.
King
Andrew
Johnson

March 4, 1849-1853

July 9, 1850

Succession

2 years, 7 months, 23 days

March 4, 1853-1857

April 18, 1853

Death

3 years, 10 months, 14 days

March 4, 1865-1869

April 15, 1865

Succession

3 years, 10 months, 17 days

Henry Wilson

March 4, 1873-1877

November 22, 1875

Death

1 year, 3 months, 10 days

Chester A.
Arthur
Thomas A.
Hendricks
Garret A.
Hobart
Theodore
Roosevelt
James S.
Sherman
Calvin
Coolidge
Harry S.
Truman
Lyndon B.
Johnson

March 4, 1881-1885

September 19, 1881

Succession

3 years, 5 months, 13 days

March 4, 1885-1889

November 25, 1885

Death

3 years, 3 months, 7 days

March 4, 1897-1901

November 21, 1889

Death

1 year, 3 months, 11 days

March 4, 1901-1905

September 14, 1901

Succession

3 years, 5 months, 18 days

March 4, 1909-1913

October 30, 1912

Death

0 years, 4 months, 5 days

March 4, 1921-1925

August 2, 1923

Succession

1 year, 7 months, 2 days

January 20, 1945-1949

April 12, 1945

Succession

3 years, 9 months, 8 days

January 20, 1961-1965

November 22, 1963

Succession

1 year, 1 month, 29 days

*Spiro Agnew

January 20, 1969-1977

October 10, 1973

Resignation

0 years, 1 month, 26 days

*Gerald Ford

October 12, 1973January 20, 1977

August 9, 1974

Succession

0 years, 4 months, 10 days

Source: Feerick, John D. From Failing Hands: The Story of Presidential Succession, Fordham University Press, New York, 1965. (*addition;
please note: Gerald Ford was never elected. He assumed the presidency upon Richard Nixon's resignation. There was an additional 2 day
vacancy between Spiro Agnew’s resignation and Gerald Ford’s assumption of the powers of the Vice Presidency on October 12, 1973).
[original and additions reprinted with permission from the author].
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Summary of Central Recommendation

PROBLEM: The current constitutional and
legal provisions fail to take into account the
possibility of a catastrophic attack on
Washington, D.C. Since all individuals
included in the Presidential line of succession
are based in our nation’s capital, a catastrophic
attack on the city could potentially kill or
incapacitate many if not all of these individuals and cause significant confusion about who
can assume the powers of the presidency.
With the inclusion of members of Congress
and acting cabinet secretaries in the line of
succession, all of whom must resign from their
current positions before assuming the presidency and can then be “bumped” from the
presidency by an individual ranking higher in
the line of succession, it is possible to have no
one remaining in the line of succession.
Current procedures leave our nation especially
vulnerable at presidential inaugurations and
State of the Union Addresses.
RECOMMENDATION: A reordering of the
Presidential line of succession to: Vice
President, Secretary of State, Secretary of the
Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney
General, followed by four or five newly appointed
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individuals residing outside of Washington,
D.C. A dual vacancy in the presidency and vice
presidency during the first two years of a term
should trigger a special election within five
months. The winner of the election would serve
the remainder of the term and would displace
the temporary successor.
The commission recommends removing
Congressional leaders and acting secretaries
from the line of succession to limit confusion
over who can assume power. It also recommends reducing the time between the casting
and counting of electoral votes as well as for
Congress to clarify procedures for incapacitation and create guidelines for continuity in the
event of an attack at the presidential inauguration or during the time period before the inauguration. If possible, the outgoing president
should appoint some or all of the incoming
president’s cabinet nominees prior to the inauguration to ensure individuals will remain in
the line of succession. The commission believes
these changes to the current provisions are
necessary to ensure continuity of the United
States’ Presidency when our nation is most
vulnerable.
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